3 Authority and Egalitarianism: Discourses of Leadership on Nukulaelae Atoll

Niko Besnier Yale University

Polynesian societies are commonly represented in traditional anthropological depictions as founded on highly visible systems of hierarchy and stratification. While cross-societal differences are acknowledged in the degree to which hierarchy is elaborated, and while the reasons for this elaboration are the subject of debate, Polynesia, as typified presumably by such societies as Samoa and Tonga, remains a textbook case of centralized chiefly systems. In recent publications, some scholars have subjected these traditional characterizations to critical scrutiny (see Howard and Kirkpatrick, 1989; Marcus, 1989, for overviews), and these re-evaluations have mitigated the classic depiction of Polynesian social structures. For example, even in societies of the region where chieflyship (and hierarchy in general) is most elaborated, it rests on at least two broad parameters, which Marcus (1989), echoing analyses advanced by Firth in past decades (1949, 1960a, 1979), terms kingliness and populism (see Feinberg, Chapter 2 this volume, for further discussion). In a particular society, more weight may be given to one parameter than to the other, and each parameter may manifest itself variously across the societies of the region. An important consequence of this account is that Polynesian chieflyship and its concomitant categories are not monolithic entities, but multidimensional concepts.

Delving further into the ideology and praxis of Polynesian chieflyship and hierarchy, some researchers have identified ambiguities and contradictions, even in Polynesian societies traditionally recognized as highly stratified. The resulting conflicts undermine the textbook presentation of Polynesian chieflyship as essentially stable over time and space. Shore (Chapter 5 this volume) presents a compelling example from Samoa: there, the social order is constantly
subverted by its very own fracture zones, and consequently breakdowns, stresses and negotiations keep disrupting social life, a state of affairs that the kingly–populist model fails to account for.

There are also Polynesian societies where chieftainship and hierarchy are so fundamentally problematic that, at first blush, contemporary views of Polynesian leadership and social order do not even seem to apply. This chapter focuses on one such case. I shall investigate here the historical antecedents and contemporary ideologies of leadership and authority on Nukulea, an atoll of the Tuvalu group on the fringes of Polynesia, populated today by about 350 people. Discourses of leadership and authority on Nukulea present tensions and contradictions, the resolution of which makes the business of being a leader in this community a very difficult task. The last century of Nukulea’s history is characterized by political and social reversals, a symptom of the ambivalence towards authority extant in contemporary Nukulea culture. This ambivalence is created by a basic suspicion of authority offset by a frequently articulated longing for a strong leadership. I shall suggest that the coexistence of these two apparently contradictory discourses is related to (but not necessarily caused by) the traumatic upheavals that Nukulea experienced in its relatively brief history of contact with the outside world. I shall also show how discursive contradictions are dealt with in the practice of leadership as I have witnessed it since beginning fieldwork on the atoll in 1979.

The arguments I develop in this chapter rest in large part on analyses of Nukulea discursive practices. My use of the term ‘discourse’ is inspired in part from the meaning which post-modernist thinkers have attached to the term (see Foucault, 1969, 1980), i.e. a corpus of ideas that represents the normalization of a community’s institutionalized notion of truth. Discourse is articulated most explicitly, although not exclusively, in talk. I will thus seek an understanding of political organization and practice in talk produced in political contexts (e.g. in meetings of various sorts) and in talk reflecting on political practice (e.g. gossip focusing on the political action of leaders, accounts offered to the ethnographer). The attention I pay to Nukulea discursive practices may be criticized as too literal-minded, too ‘surface-structure’ oriented. However, with many theoreticians (e.g. Ortner, 1984), I maintain that much of culture resides in the articulation of explanations, in the verbal construction of reality that members engage in for themselves, for each other, and for outsiders. In short, to paraphrase Foucault (1969: 39), why a particular set of discursive practices should exist rather than alternative practices is highly significant in and of itself, in that their existence is constitutive of the structure of society. In addition, a discursive approach is particularly appropriate here, given the very nature of the data. Indeed, Nukulea discourses of authority, egalitarianism and leadership are fraught with apparent contradictions and mapping problems between ideology and praxis, a state of affairs that a discursive approach is particularly well suited to analyze.¹

Nukulea discourse on political action is dominated by two ideological undercurrents, each of which calls for distinct social action. On the one hand, Nukulea people express the need for a strong authority structure for their community; on the other, they maintain a strongly egalitarian ideology, at least among members of the same age and gender group. This chapter opens with a historical survey of Nukulea social and political life since contact, which has been characterized by major demographic, social, political and economic discontinuities. This overview will serve as the background for an understanding of contemporary ideologies of leadership, which I then describe. Lastly, I show how the conflictual nature of Nukulea political ideology is dealt with in political practice.

I will illustrate the practice of Nukulea leadership in two different contexts. In the first, leadership is enacted, at a very microscopic level, in the action of the president of the highest-level organization of the atoll’s women, the Women’s Council. The second concerns the leadership structure of the entire atoll, which is predominantly under the control of older men, namely the chief and the Council of Elders. The presidency of the Women’s Council and the chieftainship of the island community are only two instances in which questions of leadership arise in contemporary Nukulea society, and there are many other areas of social life in which struggles over the meaning of leadership are enacted. Numerous organizations emerge and fade away in rapid succession on the atoll (in the same manner that the leadership of the atoll community itself is in constant state of flux, as will be discussed presently). The membership of these organizations cross-cuts the community in complex patterns. (Hoofer (1969) and Huntsman (1969) describe similar patterns for Tokelau, suggesting that they may indeed be characteristic of atoll societies.) Some of these institutions occasionally attain such importance in the social and economic life of the community that they can overshadow, for a while at least, the most fundamental institutionalized institutions. While this study focuses on only two institutions, the patterns described here are characteristic of leadership in all others as well.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Because Nukulaelae (and the rest of Tuvalu) was not missionized by Westerners, and because it stands apart from major Pacific trade routes, it was never subjected to the large influx of literate eyewitnesses from whom we have inherited voluminous accounts of life in other parts of Polynesia around the time of contact. Consequently, information on the atoll’s pre-contact social organization is extremely scant. Even oral traditions are remarkably uninformative on the topic; contemporary Nukulaeans’ representations of their pre-contact past are heavily laden with Christian ideology. Events reported to have taken place in pre-Christian days are presented as ‘preparations’ for the advent of Christianity; Nukulaeans accounts, be they oral or written (e.g. Tinilau, 1983, and other chapters in the same volume), bear suspicious resemblance to the type of discourse one finds in journals of the more rigid and ethnocentric missionaries who roamed the Pacific frontiers in the nineteenth century.

In addition, Nukulaeans historical memory underwent a major discontinuity around the time of contact. In 1863, four decades after initial contact with the Western world (in 1821), approximately 250 islanders, out of a total estimated at 300, were carried off by Peruvian slavers (‘Blackbirders’) to the island mines of Sala y Gomez, off the coast of Peru, from which none ever returned (Maude, 1981: 74–82; Munro, 1982: 63–79). Other islands of the region suffered greatly at the hands of these slavers in the early 1860s, but probably none was as devastated by slaving as Nukulaeae. According to a missionary who visited Nukulaeae in 1870, most able-bodied adults were taken away, leaving only older people and children: ‘The strong men and women were advised to leave their small children in charge of the aged. In some cases they did not; in others the men went, and left their wives and children behind’ (Whitteme, 1871: 11).

The raid was followed by further hardship not unrelated to the difficulties involved in maintaining a stable system of production with the tiny remaining population: Nukulaeae people became involved in an unfortunate contractual relationship with the German firm Godeffroy & Sohn, which deprived them of the largest islet of the atoll between 1865 and 1890 (Munro, Iosefa and Besnier, 1990); the atoll was devastated several times by major hurricanes in 1883 and 1886 (McLean and Munro, 1991); and the survivors of the Peruvian raid suffered several waves of famine, to which all other factors probably contributed directly.

In the midst of these traumatic events, the London Missionary Society dropped off the first Samoan religious teacher on the atoll in 1865. As elsewhere in Southern Tuvalu, traditional tokens of chieftainship, such as the wearing of precious pearl-shell fish-lure necklaces (pa’a kasou) and the right to the head of any turtle caught, were soon transferred from the chief to the pastor. As Goldsmith (1989: 226–76) argues, the arrival of Samoan pastors in Southern Tuvalu had some of the trappings of that of the stranger-king – to use Sahlins’ (1981) appropriation of Dumézil’s (1949) metaphor. Thus, while Samoan pastors established a hegemonic relationship over their adoptive communities, the extent to which they were able to appropriate power and authority for themselves is open to question. Today, the extent of the pastor’s influence on community politics and everyday affairs is carefully and subtly controlled by the community. Equally open to question is the extent to which the social changes associated with the pastors’ arrival were locally motivated or coerced by the pastors, who, in true Samoan fashion, saw themselves as infinitely superior to the heathen atoll-dwellers.

Whatever the answers to these questions may be, it remains the case that Nukulaeae experienced major demographic, social, political and probably cultural discontinuities between 1860 and the turn of the century. These discontinuities not only explain why contemporary Nukulaeae historical memory begins abruptly with the early 1860s, but also have implications for a reconstruction of the historical trajectory of the atoll’s leadership structure. What can be pieced together of Nukulaeae’s pre-Christian past suggests a loosely hierarchical social structure headed by a chief, selected from among the members of one particular clan or kin group, who ruled with the help of a council of elders. Chieftainship was based on a mixture of ascription and achievement, and chiefly as well as non-chiefly descent was reckoned bilaterally with a patrilineal bias. In short, Nukulaeae society was structured like other atolls of Western Polynesia (cf. Sahlins, 1958), exhibiting the least amount of hierarchical elaboration in the spectrum of Polynesia’s systems of social organization.

There is evidence that Nukulaeae’s political structure, along with every other aspects of social life, was seriously affected by the events of the early 1860s. First, the personnel associated with high-ranking positions was seriously reduced by the Blackbirding raid. While there is a place in contemporary historical memory for Tafalagilua, the chief during whose tenure the event took place, and while Tafalagilua himself was probably not kidnapped, the chiefly descent group to which he belonged was undoubtedly as decimated by the kidnapping and other disasters of the period as any other descent groups. Today, no one on Nukulaeae claims direct descent from Tafalagilua, who
probably died childless. Tafalagilua was succeeded by his classificatory sister’s son (tuaatina) Laapanu, who was in turn succeeded after his death in 1897 by the Protectorate-appointed magistrate Malaki.

Second, Nukulaelae’s workforce must have been so decimated that the land tenure system needed to be completely revised. Significantly, this task was accomplished by two strangers. According to a record of genealogies (tusi gafa) I was fortunate to be able to consult on Nukulaelae, two men from Funafuti, Vave and Taupo, arrived on Nukulaelae in the years following the Peruvian raid, and the task of dividing up the land among 28 remaining Nukulaelae men was entrusted to them. This turn of events suggests that the Blackbirding raid and other late-nineteenth-century disasters left the atoll’s authority structure so weakened that the task of redistributing the land had to be entrusted to strangers. For some reason, these strangers appear not to have established hegemonic control over the rest of the population, even though the situation was ideal for a stranger-king scenario.

Further hardship was created two years after the Blackbirding raid when Goddefroy & Sohn, a large Hamburg-based corporate venture that would soon dominate trade in the Pacific, established a coconut plantation on the largest islet of the atoll, which today is called Niouoku (i.e. ‘New York’). The islet, to the islanders’ surprise, became off-limits to them; since it represents a fourth of the atoll’s total land mass, the local population was deprived of substantial food-gathering grounds, which accentuated the food crisis already engendered by the lack of hands to continue the traditional exploitation of land and sea. There were also disagreements between planters and islanders about the terms of the lease, a classic case of cross-cultural misunderstanding aggravated by the German planters’ opportunistic duplicity.

However, the plantation left an indelible positive mark on the atoll. As was customary in nineteenth-century plantations in the Pacific and elsewhere (cf. Wolf, 1982), the planters did not hire labor locally (in this case local labor was probably not even available), but imported contract workers from other Pacific islands, including the Gilbert Islands, Kosrae, Niue, Rotuma, Samoa and the Marshall Islands. Many of these workers did not return to their home islands at the end of their contracts, establishing instead affinal ties with the Nukulaelae Islanders who had been spared by the Peruvian raid, amongst whom, conveniently, women predominated. Thus the plantation conveniently provided what Nukulaelae was in dire need of, new blood. Consequently, contemporary inhabitants have numerous kinship ties on several Pacific islands, many of which are still maintained to this day.

The situation in which the atoll found itself at the end of the nineteenth century is thus unusual: virtually every inhabitant was of non-local ancestry. The Nukulaelae community therefore faced the task of constructing a common culture despite heterogeneous identities. All one can say today is that it was achieved with a great deal of efficiency, as contemporary Nukulaelae society and culture retain no trace of their eclectic origins. However, one is tempted to speculate that the heterogeneity of Nukulaelae’s population at the turn of the century must have had some structural impact. For example, it may have served to undermine decisively the mythical, usurpatory origin of authority which appears to have worked so well elsewhere in Polynesia (Sahlins, 1981), in that this type of legitimization would have been difficult to claim in a context where everyone is of foreign origin, and hence has the potential of claiming it. However, this hypothesis remains entirely speculative.

The historical picture that can be reconstructed points to major disruptions in every aspect of life at the end of the nineteenth century, followed by a gradual (re)construction over several decades. Little is known about how the leadership structure fared in this reconstruction process, although it is likely that it needed as much reinventing as any other aspect of social life. Tafalagilua’s successor Laapanu was the last holder of the pre-contact chiefly title, and his tenure marks the end of hereditary title holding, even though Nukulaelae people still speak (in very vague terms) of a chiefly kin group. The identity of this kin group differs across contexts and persons, but no one expresses much concern about these discrepancies. In short, whatever remains of Nukulaelae chieftainship has lost all traces of the kingsness associated with chieftainship elsewhere in Polynesia (Marcus, 1989), which foregrounds the exclusivity, absoluteness and divinely legitimated character of the chief’s person, rank and authority. However, the kingly attributes of Nukulaelae chiefly authority are very much alive in what I refer to presently as Nukulaelae’s discourse of nostalgia.

In 1892 Laapanu signed with his mark a treaty of cession to Britain. Nukulaelae, where the Samoa-based London Missionary Society mission was now well entrenched (Brady, 1975: 125), was henceforth subject to yet another force from abroad – the colonial administration; it was absorbed into a protectorate in 1892, which became the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony in 1916. The colonial authorities administered Nukulaelae and the rest of the colony with a painfully meager understanding of their sociopolitical circumstances (cf. Lüem,
days is very difficult to assess. Suffice it to say that Nukulaelae Islanders speak of it as a re-enactment of the political structure of former times, and that it derives much of its legitimacy, like other instances of invented traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983), from the continuity with former times it allegedly represents. Today, all Nukulaelae political discourse is suffused with talk about the Council of Elders, tua mo aganuu ‘customs and traditions’, and the maneapa (a large, centrally located meeting house in which the Council of Elders sits and which often serves as metonymic reference to the Council), whereas many of these were absent from or incidental to comparable discourse before 1983. The impact of the change goes beyond discourse. For example, after several years of failure of the universal suffrage system, which invariably produced major factional conflicts, elections of the Nukulaelae representative to the Tuvalu national parliament have in recent years been elected faka-maneapa ‘in the way of the maneapa’ (i.e. by the Council of Elders). The authority vested in the newly (re)constituted tradition is far-reaching, and receives some legitimization from Tuvalu’s central government.

The return to a ‘traditional’ authority structure was strategically timed. Indeed, in the early 1980s, Nukulaelae began experiencing rapid social and economic changes, some of which resulted from Tuvalu’s recent accession to independence. Suddenly, Nukulaelae began having much greater access to ‘non-traditional’ resources through its links with Tuvalu’s central government, which devotes itself principally to redistributing foreign aid, and through young men from the atoll being hired by overseas shipping companies, income from which greatly exceeds the sums which Nukulaelae Islanders were used to handling. The symptoms of change were clear: the traditional open-wall houses, thatched with pandanus leaves, gave way to cement-block houses with corrugated-iron roofs, many of which are still unfinished at the time of writing; in a matter of months, outboard motors and aluminum dinghies almost completely replaced dug-out canoes for transportation and fishing; and cash became an increasingly conspicuous feature of exchanges. These changes introduce tokens of wealth (e.g. money, imported goods) that are more conspicuous than the ‘traditional’ tokens (e.g. exchange networks). They favor the creation of capitalistic inequality and private enterprise, which, when in the ‘wrong’ hands, are potentially disruptive of the traditionalism embodied in the revived chiefly system.

Furthermore, beginning with the 1980s, control over resources, principally monetary wealth, gradually shifted to groups over which the ‘traditional’ economy had least control. Most prominently,
young seamen have suddenly become the key to monetized economic power. Upon their return to the atoll, these men are increasingly reluctant to participate in a political structure which places them at the bottom of the hierarchy, under older people’s authority. They raise far-reaching questions about the status quo, demanding a political voice which they did not have in the old order, thereby creating much tension in meetings of the Council of Elders. Because their numbers are still small, their actions remain covert and sabotage-like, as is typical of the political action of powerless groups around the world (cf. Scott, 1985; Comaroff, 1985). Yet the current holders of positions of power and authority view these young men as extremely threatening and disruptive of social order, as will be illustrated presently; and the re-establishment of a more blatantly hierarchical political system has close links to the emergent possibility of a power struggle associated with changing economic conditions. What better way to direct attention from threatening socioeconomic change than to reinvent tradition? However, these changes are also steeped in the discursive contradictions to which I now turn — whether these contradictions anedate changes in political economy, whether they are the result of these changes, or whether they are constitutive of them.\footnote{DISCOURSES OF AUTHORITY AND Egalitarianism}

Nukulaelae people of all ages and both gender groups frequently voice the belief that their community prospered when it was ruled with an iron fist. (The use of the past tense in this characterization will be motivated presently.) I use the term ‘prosper’ to translate several notions which go hand-in-hand in Nukulaelae discourse: the community prospers when *fiteemua* ‘peace’ and *feaalofani* ‘mutual empathy, harmony’ reign amongst people, and when things are *tonu* ‘right, straight’ and generally *gali* ‘beautiful’. These vignettes, which are familiar from other Polynesian contexts, compose an idealized picture of life in the best of times. While contemporary Nukulaelae Islanders do not generally talk about the *mana* of those in authority (the term is reserved for religious contexts), their accounts of the relationship between authority and prosperity indicate that it is mediated by the same processes as are termed *mana* in other Polynesian societies (Firth, 1940; Shore, 1989). In the past, prosperity legitimized authority, while legitimate authority engendered prosperity (cf. Feinberg, Chapter 2 this volume).

The constitutive association of authority and fecundity is mostly
evident in discourse about the past: with surprising unanimity, Nukulaelae people reminisce longingly about the days when any command issued by the chief or the council would be cheerfully complied with by everyone. In those days, they maintain, one heard none of the grumblings and negotiations one witnesses today whenever a community decision is made. (Whether these days ever existed or not is of little relevance here: the important point is that the state of affairs represented by these reminiscences is seen as desirable from a contemporary perspective.) The same metaphors and rhetorical structures emerge over and over again in discourse about the authoritarian past. The rhetorical parallelism of the last three words in following excerpt (‘Fai’ ‘fai eiloo!’ “Do [this!][i] and [it] was done!”), in which a command is reported in direct speech and echoed by a description of the action that followed from the command, is particularly conspicuous in such discourse (it is also frequent in certain other contexts, as when adults *polopolooki* ‘admonish’ younger people).\footnote{DISCOURSES OF AUTHORITY AND Egalitarianism}


Like, in those days, only one [imperative] sentence [was needed], you see? If it was said, ‘We will reserve that area [of the lagoon], no fishing is to be done there’, no one ever voiced an opinion about it, see? ‘Do [this!][i] [and it] was done!’

In the past, legitimate authority brought *manua* ‘prosperity, fortune’ to the atoll, in a pattern reminiscent of ideologies extant elsewhere in Polynesia (Firth, 1940). Under the authority of the right individual, the sea yielded its bounties, so that dolphins and whales, neither of which is consumed as food, were the only things that remained at the bottom of the sea. The land was equally bountiful, coconuts fell like rain, and rats did not reproduce. In short, the principal measurement of the legitimacy of the authority structure is the abundance of food; as in the case of Rotuma and other Polynesian societies (e.g. Feinberg, Chapter 2 this volume), an abundance of food is indicative of a proper political order, its scarcity indicative of political malaise’ (Howard, 1985: 67).

According to this discourse, the olden days contrast with the present time, when the chief and the Council of Elders have no authority. Today, men in positions of authority ‘allow’ younger men to voice dissenting opinions, to challenge their authority, and to negotiate orders. According to critics of the contemporary state of
affairs, the elders’ words are no longer deeds, they are open to challenge.

Significantly, this *discourse of nostalgia* (a term I am borrowing from Harris, 1989) is not an exclusive characteristic of talk produced by members of the group most likely to be in a hegemonic position in the old order. Rather, it is characteristic of private and public contexts alike, and of opinions articulated by the least powerful as well as by those with the most secure claims to power. The discourse of nostalgia is maintained by everyone on the atoll, including those who are most likely to be barred from political power in a gerontocratic and gendered authoritarian system, namely women and younger men. Witness how a 25-year-old interviewee, who has established for himself a reputation as a trouble-maker, narrates some of his recent counter-hegemonic exploits, ending with the familiar rhetorical parallelism described earlier:


Like, when [someone] says, ‘We’ll [contribute] a swamp-taro corm each!’, there isn’t any-, this-[in] this type of event, it was impossible to answer, ‘No, let’s discuss it [first].’ When [someone] says, ‘We’ll [contribute] a swamp-taro corm each!’ ‘This is [what’s going to happen]!’, this is [what happened]!

Importantly, in the views of the powerless, what the discourse of nostalgia depicts is an ideal state, even though it defines their powerlessness, and not simply the price one has to pay to maintain prosperity and social order.

The positive image of the olden days as a time when authority was strong and, as a result, when life was good is held by every member of the community, including those who would have most to lose in a hypothetical return to authoritarianism. The major difference between invocations of the discourse of nostalgia by the less powerful and by the more powerful is connotational: for the powerless, the deterioration of the authority structure is blamed on the chief and the elders. Thus those in positions of authority do not have much authority nowadays because they are not capable of exerting control. In this discourse, there is little room for attenuating circumstances deriving from changing social and economic conditions. However, this difference is peripheral to the fundamental similarities in the discourse of nostalgia, which is maintained across all segments of the community.

In the very same breath as they articulate the discourse of nostalgia, Nukulaela Islanders can also be virulently critical of anyone with pretensions of rising above others. Those whose actions or words suggest even remotely that they see themselves as wealthier, more powerful, better informed or otherwise superior to others are greeted with scorn, mockery and suspicion. Such individuals are considered dangerous, and, in the words of one of my respondents (himself extremely ambitious in the political arena), is *alamati* ‘watched in ambush’ by everyone else on the atoll:

*Te fenua teenei ne faaite ki luga i kau papa o mea konei, faaite ki luga i kau papa o mea konaa, paa, e ita ssuaa tino i ssuaa tino maa fano ki luga, e nofo faelo ea te lamiatiga, nee! A tino teelaal, kaak tasi, sae aka loo se tino, ‘Aa!, ko- koot teelaal?’. ‘Ee! Fai (kee) maasei!’ Te- te uiga o te fenua teenei, te mea koo iloa nee au. […] Te mea teenaa ne faiu mai loo mo te fenua teenei. Se uiga taataumau eelo o te fenua teenei. Se manako se tino Nukulaela kee maaduga aka ssuaa tino Nukulaela laa laa.[N 1991: 1:A: 591–5, B: 001–005]

This atoll is made of coral reefs fashioned out of such material, like, people do not want other people to rise above [others], they *keep watching in ambush*, right? That person, one person, who rises to the top, [everyone says], ‘Oh!, who’s he [to do such a thing]?’ ‘Hey! Try to tarnish [him]!’. That’s the- the way of this atoll, the way I know it. […] That trait was born with this atoll. It’s a trait that’s deeply ingrained in this atoll community. Nukulaela people do not want another person to be higher up than themselves.

These statements are evidence of another set of discursive practices, which I refer to as the *discourse of egalitarianism.*

The discourse of egalitarianism proclaims that everyone in the community is on the same footing, and that no one is entitled to exert any type of authority over others, thus leaving little room for hierarchy and the exercise of leadership. This discourse can take a variety of forms. For example, it can be articulated in statements about the importance of equality between members of the community, as the last quote illustrates. In addition, in recent years, it has manifested itself in arguments that rest on the constitutional protection of human rights, as I shall illustrate in the next section. Most saliently, the discourse of egalitarianism surfaces in the manipulation of symbolic
tools commonly associated with counter-hegemonic action: ridicule, gossip, contempt and spoofing (cf. Shore, Chapter 5 this volume). For example, whenever the chief himself or the Council of Elders as a body attempt to exert control over the atoll community, they are reproached and ridiculed for being too bossy. The ridicule can be sharp and personal. Any public action by the chief which might betray a claim to power and authority is torn to pieces in gossip, in which Nukulaelae people are particularly adept at casting one another in an extremely negative light (Besnier, 1989a, 1990a, 1994). At times, criticisms of those in positions of authority are clearly motivated by the simple fact that being in that position raises one's station above that of others. Witness the following tirade, in which the speaker rails against the atoll's current authority structure:

Nei laa i aso nei, koo tino lima matai o Nukulaelae, kae isi e tino lima matai foolikiki, kae toko tasi te matai putaputa, ka ko ia eeloo e lasi kaee puta, teelaa e aumai ki te pou i te kogaa lofo, fakasagasaga i e, te mea kee kai saale, kee lasi tena laulau, kee fai ana laauga kee ggeli, [ . . . ]


These days, there are [about] fifty heads of household on Nukulaelae, there are fifty small heads of household, and one plump one, the latter is big and fat, he's brought to the post in the middle [of the maneapa], he's made to sit there, so that he can keep eating, so that he gets a big leaf tray [during feasts], so that he can make nice speeches, [ . . . ] [The rest of the sentence contains expletives]

In short, in the discourse of egalitarianism, leaders are reproached for being leaders, because being a leader places them in a higher position than the rest of the community.

Nukulaelae Islanders thus present to themselves and to outsiders a complex discursive field, in which two seemingly incompatible discourses coexist. It is important to emphasize that framing the problem posed by the discursive contradictions in terms of tensions between different contexts does not solve the problem. First of all, Nukulaelae Islanders can switch very quickly, within a single interaction, from one discourse to the other, without any observable change in other aspects of context. The discourse of egalitarianism and the discourse of nostalgia sometimes reinforce one another, even though the enactment of one makes the enactment of the other impossible. Second, discourse and context are in a constitutive relationship: accounting for the coexistence of conflicting discourses in terms of tensions across contexts only shifts the locus of the problem, because the coexistence of conflicting contexts still remains to be accounted for. Thus, for both descriptive and theoretical reasons, the ideological problem presented here remains a problem of discourse.

The characterization of Nukulaelae’s discourses of authority and egalitarianism as ‘contradictory’, ‘incompatible’, and ‘conflicting’ needs to be qualified. Throughout this chapter, I hedge these qualifiers with modifiers like ‘seemingly’ and ‘apparently’, because they raise an important problem of representation: to what extent are these discourses contradictory for Nukulaelae Islanders themselves? There is strong evidence that the coexistence of these discourses is as problematic from an emic perspective as it seems from the outside. Indeed, Nukulaelae Islanders themselves talk about this coexistence as a fakalavelave ‘problem, cause for preoccupation’. Furthermore, the coexistence of two discourses presents serious problems for the practice of leadership and authority, as I shall illustrate in the next section. Contradiction, tension and ambivalence are best viewed as constitutive of Nukulaelae political ideology and practice. Viewing the coexisting discourses as contradictory does not preclude management in praxis, even though the resolution of contradictions might never be achieved.11

The coexistence of discourses of nostalgia and egalitarianism is of course not particular to Nukulaelae or to Polynesian atoll societies. Even in Samoa, traditionally viewed as exhibiting one of the most stratified social structures of the Polynesian region, tensions exist between dignified and elaborated manifestations of the political process on the one hand, and a distinctive taste for off-stage satire which caricatures the dignity and elaboration of political life (Shore, Chapter 5 this volume). Shore shows that what takes place off-stage in Samoa is not just a marginal aspect of political life: rather, the tension between on-stage and off-stage social action is constitutive of political life (an analysis also advanced in much of the resistance literature, e.g. Scott, 1985, 1990).12 The parallel between Shore’s description of political action in the Samoan village and certain aspects of the Nukulaelae situation is striking.

What Nukulaelae lacks in comparison with the Samoan village is a built-in system of inequality in the inheritance of chiefly prerogatives and the complex system of entitlement one finds in Samoa. While kept more or less honest by the off-stage presence of potentially subversive satirical discourses, the Samoan political system still guarantees the presence and survival of hierarchy and the ensuing system
of inequality. In Nukulaelae’s case, the legitimation of power and authority is considerably more problematic. Authoritarian action and the exercise of power lack a solid foundation, which, even if it existed prior to contact, has been thoroughly undermined by the tormented history of the atoll since contact. As a result, the discourse of egalitarianism has the potential of gnawing at the very base of the authoritarian edifice called for by the discourse of nostalgia, as I shall show in the rest of this chapter. Consequently, being a Nukulaelae leader is no easy task.

NUKULAELAE LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE

The coexistence of the two discourses I described in the previous section has obvious but complex implications for the practice of leadership on Nukulaelae. How can leadership function and what shape does it have against a background of discursive contradictions? In this section, I shall explore several ways in which Nukulaelae leaders more or less successfully negotiate the trappings associated with their social roles.

One of the most common ways in which Nukulaelae Islanders in positions of leadership negotiate their difficult station is by avoiding at all costs presenting themselves as speaking or acting on their own behalf. Instead, they invariably present themselves as sui ‘representative’ of a group. The term sui, a borrowing from Samoan, has many referents. It is applied to any element of a set which stands in a metonymic or metaphorical relationship to the entire set; possible translations are ‘representative, delegate’, ‘illustration, example’, or ‘replacement’. Acting as the sui of a group has positive connotations: it implies that one is willing to place the concerns of the polity before one’s own selfish priorities or before the localized interests of one’s kin group. Comparable strategies are found in other communities which emphasize egalitarian ideologies, such as various groups in the Papua New Guinea Highlands (Goldman, 1983: 134; Rumsey, 1986: 290; Strathern, 1975: 199).

The groups which individuals can claim to represent vary in nature from context to context: a person can claim to represent part of the atoll community (but, interestingly, generally not the entire community), small subdivisions of particular groups, or anything in between. The position of sui is stressed whenever a leader uses his or her position to take the floor. For example, the chief during my 1991 field sojourns invariably prefaced his speeches in the maneapa with some variation of the following utterance: ‘e tua atu moo fai te sui o maaua nei’, ‘I am

getting up [to make a speech] as the representative of the two of us here’, in which the first-person dual exclusive pronoun maaua refers honorifically to the elders seated in his vicinity. This strategy became so much his stock phrase that he was constantly ridiculed about it behind his back. His constant references to the fact that he was speaking as a representative came to be seen as yet another index of the poverty of his speech-making skills and of his inappropriateness in a position of leadership.

Similar patterns are found in expressions referring to groups in positions of authority. All members of the community commonly refer to the Council of Elders as te fenua ‘the atoll community’. Similarly, the Council of Women is not referred to as a council, but as faafine o te fenua ‘the atoll community’s women’. Yet the membership of the Council of Elders excludes most adult women, all children, as well as everyone classifiable as a ‘young man’ (tamataene) or ‘young woman’ (tamaafine). In the same vein, the Council of Women mostly comprises the wives of members of the Council of Elders; younger married women do attend meetings of the council, but are under much pressure to be seen and not heard, to acknowledge and respect the older women’s authority with their silent presence. Referring to these bodies with metonymic labels has a legitimizing function: it provides the illusion of adhering to egalitarian ideals, while covertly facilitating the authority of a small subgroup over the rest of the group’s membership.

Labelling is a powerful manipulative tool in that, like other features of language, descriptors are in a constitutive relationship to the social categories and institutions they refer to: not only do they reflect these categories, but they also create them, reinforce them and present them in a specific light. However, descriptive labels are not enough; to be maximally effective, the institutions thus labelled must be associated with discourses which confirm, reinforce and reify these labels and their connotations. And indeed, decision-making on Nukulaelae is invariably framed so as to create the illusion that decisions are reached by corporate entities, even when a small group or single individual is ultimately in charge.

The example I use to illustrate this point is extracted from a meeting of the Council of Women, a group which was constituted after the 1983 re-establishment of the ‘traditional’ political structure, in overt emulation of the Council of Elders. Once a month, this council meets and negotiates such issues as how the next round of feasts should be run, or the number of mals women will have to weave for an upcoming gift to the pastor. The unifying characteristic
of all topics broached during these meetings is that they concern mea a faafine ‘women’s things’, the exact definition of which is a complex question beyond the scope of this chapter. The extract I present here is of a meeting in which the president of the council announces the ‘program’ (polokalame) of the Women’s Day celebrations to be held the following August. Such programs include fairly rigorous dress codes and regulations of the type of food that should be brought to and consumed during the feasts (words in bold will be analyzed presently):

(Eil), i te taeao, lanu tasi katao eiloo. [...] Tiaeao, (taki ttunu mai eiloo te) vai vela, (kae aumai kkoee kee palu i ei). [...] Ia, gatu lanu tasi! Heei loo he gatu lanu tasi kee kee matea atu, peelaa, e isi he mea maasei i ei. A-. Mata eeloo! A tiito teelaa e matea atu he tamaa ila me he teelagaa i tene lanu tasi, sala. Tasi ttuala. Taatou lanu tasi, ggali katao katao katao eiloo. Lanu tasi konei e pei nei, hee toe matea kee pei mai i te te Aukuso teelaa, nee?, i te Aukuso. Fai eiloo fakalei titou gatu kee ggali taatou.
[From o Faafine 1991: 1.B: 588–600]
(Hmm,) in the morning, everyone will [wear] solid colors. [...] In the morning, everyone will boil her own hot water, (and bring it here [to the maneapa] for it to be steeped and sweetened). [...] So, clothes of solid colors! No clothes should be seen with, like, a spot of dirt on it. Hmm. I’m not kidding! Whoever is seen with a spot of dirt or a stain on her solid color [will be] fined. One dollar. We all wear solid colors, everything everything will be beautiful. These solid-colored clothes, they should be different from the ones that were worn last August, right?, last August. Let’s get our clothes ready so we can all be beautiful.

Several characteristic patterns emerge from the above extract. First, as in many other Nukulaeae contexts, authority is presented as having one purpose: that of enforcing conformity, equality and uniformity, the achievement of which is equated with beauty (gali). Second, authority is frequently agentless (cf. Duranti 1990) on Samoan political meetings; authoritative commands sometimes have the structure of statements (e.g. gatu lanu tasi! ‘clothes of solid colors!’), or bear no overt subject (e.g. sala ‘will be fined’), in which case I have used in the above translation a passive construction – the closest English equivalent to the original construction. So the voice of authority, which is typically impersonal, owes its existence to the furthering of egalitarianism, the very value which disenfranchises authority. What we are witnessing here is a clever resolution of the potential conflict between egalitarian and authoritarian ideologies, a resolution in which the latter neutralizes the former by appropriating it. This resolution then becomes political practice, as Foucault (1969) would have predicted, in the service of those that control it.

When the voice of authority is named, it is attributed to the group, and not to an individual: decisions are not made by any single person, but by the entire group. As is the case of political talk in Western societies (Seidel, 1975; Urban, 1986; Wilson, 1990: 45–76), pronoun choice is a particularly rich area in which those in control of the floor can manipulate authority and agency in general, because the indexical nature of pronouns makes them potentially less open to accountability and scrutiny than more straightforwardly referential areas of language structure (cf. Besnier, 1990b). In the following Aside, which the Council of Women’s president utters between the two halves of the last quote, a sharp contrast is drawn between taatou ‘we [inclusive]’ and maatou ‘we [exclusive]’, the former being a reference to all women present, the latter to the council’s governing committee:

I mea oki loo a taatou, heeai ia maatou, e ia taatou fakatasi, kolaa ne iku foki i te fono.
These are things we [inclusive] all decided, it wasn’t us [exclusive], but all of us [inclusive] altogether, what was decided in the [previous] meeting.

Further on, as she ‘displays’ (folofola) the details of the program, the president states that all women must wear new undergarments, which will be ‘examined’ (aasi) on Women’s Day to ascertain that they are indeed new:

A mea konaa e aasi. E olo atu eiloo a faafine, a- a mea konei o- o fakamasuesue peelaa titou gatu, maalie ua peelaa, kee lavea titou sooti, nee?
[From o Faafine 1991: 1:B: 601–3]
These things will be examined. Women will go around and- and lift up our skirts, just a bit like that, so that our shorts can be seen, right?

Newness and cleanliness, concerns for which echo directly nineteenth-century missionary discourse, “together with uniformity and equality, are the ingredients of that sought-after state, ‘beauty’ (gali).

Again, the authoritarian control of intimate details of people’s lives is legitimized by the fact that it was taatou ‘we [inclusive]’ that made up these rules; and when these rules are made up, they must
immediately be obeyed, as prescribed by the familiar rhetorical parallelism:

_Pati a taatou ne hai, fai eiloo._


What we [inclusive] said [should be done], that’s what will be done.

As in talk in the egalitarian communities investigated by Brenneis (1987), the overt message is that ‘no single voice has control, and no individual is responsible’ (1987: 506).

At stake here is not simply the extent to which agents control symbolic forms of authority like cleanliness. A more important aspect of the authority being exerted in the Women’s Day ‘program’ is economic and practical. Indeed, the ‘program’ required participants to obtain new garments in order to display their willingness to contribute to the spirit of togetherness (and to avoid being fined). Because new garments are usually not available for purchase on the atoll, many women have to rely on whatever reciprocity network they have previously established with the outside world to procure these goods. Many personal letters written around the time of such events include panicky requests for money, clothing and whatever else has been made _de rigueur_ for these events (Besnier, 1989b). Last but not least, women have to deal with timing problems: ten ship visits a year do not lend themselves to a rapid turnover of goods. Thus the economic and logistic hardships created by such ‘programs’ can be extremely burdensome, as several women asserted to me in reference to this particular instance. However, the alternative to not finding a way of procuring new outfits is to face both shaming and further economic hardships in the guise of fines.

I have illustrated here how the authority structure seeks legitimacy by invoking and appropriating for itself a discourse of egalitarianism under many different guises. These invocations not only provide the desired legitimacy, but also ensure that overt opposition in the name of the egalitarian ideology will not be possible. These strategies work in many cases, particularly when the motivation for authoritarianism is of relatively little consequence. However, there are contexts in which authoritarian discourse simply does not work. The case I describe next illustrates the fragility of Nukulaelae’s authority structure.

The case in question concerns attempts by the Council of Elders to enforce prohibition on Nukulaelae. This case is complicated by the fact that prohibition has historical antecedents, and that this particular attempt to impose prohibition is embedded in a background of intense social change, characterized by a complex struggle over power and authority. Of its historical antecedents, suffice it to say that Nukulaelae has a long history of being dry. The control of alcohol consumption was inspired by the stringent regulations that the colonial government imposed on the Tuvalu group from the late nineteenth century until the 1960s. While most other islands of the group did away with prohibition in the 1960s, Nukulaelae remained dry until the late 1970s, at which time prohibition simply died out for lack of enforcement (although the moralistic discourse on drinking did not change much). However, in 1988 again, the newly (re)constituted Council of Elders voted to outlaw drinking altogether, after observing what it judged to be an increase in drinking-related violence on the atoll.

The outlawed activity consists principally in the production and consumption of sour toddy (_kao, kamagii_), a rather potent wine comparable to West African palm wine, obtained from the natural fermentation of coconut sap, which, in its unfermented state, is a major ingredient in the everyday atoll diet. The production of fresh coconut sap (_kaleve_) is the prime responsibility of younger men, who are also the consumers of the fermented drink. Recall that this group in recent years has also acquired a pivotal economic role by becoming the prime producer of the commodity which is now central to Nukulaelae’s economic life, namely money. It is also when drinking that this group behaves in ways that are seen as most visibly threatening to the ‘traditional’ order: as elsewhere in the Pacific (cf. Marshall, 1979), drinking is associated with displays of bravado, fist fights, assertiveness towards women in public, and damage to property, all of which are seen as threats to communal _fileemau_ ‘peace’. In short, drinking enables a normally voiceless group to claim a voice.15 The meaning of the newly reconstituted prohibition and of the conflict that ensued is not difficult to read: prohibition is a symbolic attempt to maintain a power differential across age groups that is increasingly threatened by changing economic conditions. (The dynamics of Nukulaelae prohibition offer many striking parallels with attempts to impose prohibition on Namoluk atoll in Micronesia (Marshall, 1975).) The logic at play here relies opportunistically on the cultural definition of drinking as constitutive of the displays of bravado, the verbal and physical violence and other antisocial behavior that accompany liquor drinking by young men.

In the course of the mid-1980s drinking became one of the central concerns of the Council of Elders. Few meetings were held during which the issue was not discussed. The rod that the Council of Elders uses in enforcing prohibition is referred to as _falesea_, a Samoan
borrowing rarely or never heard on other islands of Tuvalu (well-informed people from other islands frequently do not know the word), which I translate loosely as ‘ostracized’. When one is falaesee, one is barred from partaking in community feasts and events, forbidden to enter the maneapa, forbidden to take part in games, including games where young men and young women get together, and prohibited to work for money, although one is still required to take part in unpaid communal work. By all accounts, falaesee is serious business in a society whose members learn early in life that a sense of self-worth can only be derived from partaking in communal activities. The economic implications of being falaesee are also severe: while the Council of Elders can no longer block the hiring of seamen from abroad, it can close the doors to the meager local employment opportunities (e.g. working on sea-wall construction for minimal wages).

The problem is that, without young able-bodied men, the community cannot function, a fact that the young men themselves were prompt to note. Almost as soon as prohibition came into effect, ostensibly to cut down on the amount of fighting and vandalism that drinking was ‘causing’, the new law was broken. One by one, no matter how careful they were, young men were discovered drinking, either because of tattling or the potent smell of fermented toddy, coupled with the tiny size of the land mass on which the village is built. One by one, they came before the Council of Elders to ask for forgiveness (jakatoosee). One young man was asked to pay a A$500 fine, an enormous amount of money by Nukulaelae standards. The Tuvalu Government’s judicial branch got wind of the affair and sent word to Nukulaelae that the fine was illegal, and the money was returned to the young man. Others were required to faagai te fenua ‘feed the atoll community’, i.e. throw a feast for all 350-odd inhabitants, which places a substantial economic burden on the young men and their families. Others still were severely polopoloooki ‘admonished’ in public. The Council of Elders’ debates turned to whether or not ostracized young men should be allowed to ‘return’ to the community at all, and at what cost. And these debates continue, engendering factionalism within the Council of Elders between traditionalists on the one hand and younger, better educated and more worldly members on the other. Indeed the clashes in recent months have been extremely heated.

Prohibition also raises a problem of some consequence, namely that of the extent of the Council of Elders’ jurisdiction. Does the Council of Elders have the ‘traditional’ authority to enforce prohibition it purports to have? Indeed, as everyone on Nukulaelae knows well today, Tuvalu’s constitution calls for the protection of human rights (saolotoga o timo), which can be argued to include the right to drink liquor (but, of course, not to disrupt community peace, a crucial factor if one defines drinking and disorder as constitutionally related). There is a government-appointed magistrate on Nukulaelae, as well as a policeman and, according to the opponents of prohibition (i.e. all younger men, some elders and many women of all ages), these are the bodies that should be in charge of controlling antisocial behavior, not the Council of Elders. For the Council of Elders, which has become more and more entrenched in its opposition to the abolition of prohibition, the situation has become a perilous test of the legitimacy of its authority.

And perilous it is. In 1989 a group of about twenty ostracized young men (a major proportion of the total number of young men) asked for a hearing in which they would have essentially questioned the authority of the Council of Elders to impose prohibition. Since they paid head taxes, the young men wished to argue, they could not be barred from government-funded work. The result was predictable: the Council refused to hear them, and dismissed them with the age-old parallelism:


They said, ‘That’s our order.’ ‘This is [how it will be done],’ [and] this is [the way it’s to be done], we should go away.

The young men, feeling angry (kai tawa) and hurt (mnae te loto, literally, ‘the heart aches’), resolved that they would ‘do something bad’ to the atoll community (fokamaaseti te fenua). After many debates held in the bush around sour toddy, they decided that they would set fire to the store’s supply of benzene and to strategic houses, and set themselves adrift in the atoll community’s catamaran, in a suicidal pattern that has historical antecedents on Nukulaelae and elsewhere in Polynesia (cf. Firth, 1961).

Predictably, word of these plans reached the rest of the atoll community. Even though the young men’s plans had by that time died a natural death, the alert was sounded, and, according to all accounts (these events are known to me only through post hoc descriptions), daily routines were completely disrupted. The community was mobilized in round-the-clock patrols, some of whom guarded the benzene shed, while others patrolled the paths, stood vigil around key
targets, and spied on those who were perceived as ‘gang leaders’ (who were enjoying every minute of the panic they had created). The situation lasted several weeks, during which able-bodied men slept very little.

Finally, the pastor was brought into the picture. This move is a typical response to more ‘serious’ disruptions of social order; and, as on Namoluk atoll (Marshall, 1975), it demonstrates to everyone involved the seriousness of the problem, since the pastor, as a stranger, ideally remains peripheral to the daily lives of his flock, particularly when dirty laundry is being aired out. The pastor ‘invited’ (aami) the young men and ‘helped’ (fesoasamoi) them by advising them to faipati fakallei ‘speak properly’ with the chief. Subsequently the situation calmed down, and the young men were eventually readmitted into the atoll community after handing in a token apology. The main leader of the movement left the atoll for a year, and returned to nothing more than memories of the events in which he played a central role. Such is the course of the numerous conflicts that characterize daily life on Nukulaelae: extraordinarily disruptive events are left to fade away. However, the debate over prohibition is far from resolved.

These events demonstrate how a traditionally marginalized group has the power, in essence, to immobilize the Council of Elders. With a few carefully chosen tools, such as rumor, the ostracized young managed to disrupt the life of the community in fundamental ways. While exhibiting all the deference expected of them in their dealings with the Council of Elders, they created a situation in which the very legitimacy of the Council of Elders’ authority was questioned. The struggle for egalitarianism is of course framed differently in this situation. Since egalitarianism does not apply across age categories in the ‘traditional’ system, the young men invoked a discourse of human rights as protected by the constitution of the new state of which Nukulaelae is a part. In fact, this discourse is invoked more and more frequently in contesting the fragile authority of the Council of Elders. It is heard in other situations, the most prominent of which is a comparable case of ostracism decreed by the Council of Elders against a middle-aged man who has left the one Christian denomination to which all other members of the community belong (Besnier, 1994), and through which the Council of Elders justifies its claims to authority. In short, the coexistence of various discourses on Nukulaelae makes the exertion of authority a very hazardous enterprise. The power that even the most marginal individuals have to undermine the authority of leaders is simply too great.

Against this backdrop of normative indeterminacy, it should come as no surprise that leadership roles on Nukulaelae are regarded with a great deal of ambivalence. On the one hand, individuals sometimes accept positions where they stand a chance to have their voice heard (if not respected) and their symbolic capital increased in terms of the prestige that they might accrue. On the other hand, Nukulaelae Islanders know the precariousness of positions of leadership, the stratagems leaders have to devise to make their authority appear to be something else (cf. Bailey, 1988), and the difficulties involved in maintaining a presentable image in the eyes of others. As a result, positions of leadership are frequently difficult to fill. For example, at the beginning of 1990, the chieftainship of the atoll was left vacant by a resignation; as the following account illustrates, the Council of Elders had difficulties finding a new chief:

[... ] kae ona ko te mea e toko uke tino ne fai atu, see talia nve tino. Fili atu tino, see talia. Teena, e toko fia tino kolu ne tuko atu ki ei, see talia, tuko atu ki ei, talia nee ia. Teena te- te mea ne loa nee au, te filiga teena. Seeai ake foki se tino ne talia nee ia kee fano ia o ulu femua, a koo tuku atu ki ei, mea loa koo talia nee ia. [V 1991: 1B: 102–8]

[... ] because many people were asked [if they could fill the position], but they all turned it down. Every time someone else was chosen, he refused. Who knows how many people were asked who refused. [Then] it was given to him [the current chief], and he accepted. As far as my understanding goes of that investiture. No one else would accept the position, but when it was given to him, he accepted.

Firth (1960b) describes comparable ambivalence at times of chiefly succession on Tikopia, but Nukulaelae differs from Tikopia both in the cause and procedure of ambivalence: while there is no instance of a Tikopian refusing a chiefly position, such instances abound on Nukulaelae. One feature of Nukulaelae chiefly succession (and of ascendance to any position of leadership) bears strong resemblances to the Tikopia material: enthusiastically welcoming the offer of a position of leadership is seen as evidence of a lack of humility and met with great scorn (see also Donner (1988) on Sikaiana).

And indeed, in the above quote, the speaker’s contempt for the man who accepted the chiefly position after so many had turned it down is thinly disguised. The odds were against this particular Nukulaelae leader right from the beginning, and things have gone downhill ever since. Contempt for this man is shared by many in the atoll community; all quotes presented in this chapter in which the chief is ridiculed in fact bear on this individual. Lacking the gravitas
that Nukulaelae people, like other Polynesians (Firth, 1960a), expect
of holders of positions of consequence, unkempt in his appearance
(he is grossly overweight, his shirts are always torn, etc.), erratic in
his decisions and actions, this man harangues everyone with his
repetitive, unimaginative, and tactless public speeches, which he
delivers at great length while constantly pulling down on his rent shirts
in an attempt to cover his protruding belly. However, at the same
time, the limelight in which his prominent position places him is
wonderfully functional for the island community: his actions and
words are mercilessly ridiculed in backstage clowning and gossip,
even by his own close kin. When his verbal blunders and nonverbal
improprieties are particularly blatant, ridiculing even takes place,
more or less discreetly, right under his nose. In short, this leader’s
desperate attempts to claim for himself the attributes that the dis-
course of nostalgia associates with his social position constitute
superb material for the discourse of egalitarianism.

CONCLUSION
I began this chapter with a historical overview. I showed how
Nukulaelae had undergone major demographic, social and political
changes during the second half of the nineteenth century, which, I
surmise, must have affected every aspect of Nukulaelae culture. The
atoll community emerged from these changes with a population which
differed radically from the pre-contact and early-contact population.
In addition, whatever mythical base on which the legitimacy of
pre-contact chieftainship might have rested was severely undermined
or forgotten altogether. The result is that, as it approached the turn
of the century, Nukulaelae exhibited few of the political attributes
traditionally associated with Polynesian political structures, even if
these were present before contact.

The discussion then turned to an evaluation of contemporary
discourse on leadership and authority. Here two major patterns are
discernible. In the discourse of nostalgia, Nukulaelae Islanders long
for an idealized past when the authority of those in power was
absolute, and, as a result, when life was happy and resources abun-
dant. According to this discourse, today’s political structure is a
deteriorated caricature of the ‘true’ thing. At the same time,
Nukulaelae Islanders express a strong desire for a state in which
everyone is equal, where no one rises above others, and where no one
has authority over others. How can these seemingly contradictory
discourses leave any room for a political structure? Is structure what
one should look for in this situation, or should one rather search for
some level of political organization without political order, to use
Firth’s (1954) classical distinction, or even for the ‘complex mix of
order, antiorder, and nonorder’ that Moore (1987: 730) describes?
Nukulaelae’s contemporary political organization is explicitly
grounded in the first of these ideological undercurrents. Since the
early 1980s, the atoll community has sought to ‘revive’ what it sees
as a traditional chiefly system. Those in charge of this system are
expected to find a balance between the two ideologies. They manage
to do so in the practice of everyday political life by giving any
authoritarian move the veneer of a move that furthers egalitarianism,
a strategy in which political talk plays a central role. However, when
more far-reaching issues are concerned, such as the imposition of
prohibition, these strategies run aground.

The objective of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of
the relationship between ideology and social praxis. One important
question which this chapter has not answered is where the discursive
tensions described here take root. The most obvious place to search
for these roots is in history. I have hinted at the potential role that
Nukulaelae’s tormented post-contact history may have had in the
emergence of multiple discourses. However, the lack of precise his-
torical data makes it impossible to prove or disprove this hypothesis.
It is tempting to ascribe an extraterritorial origin to one or the other
discourse that I have identified as constitutive of political ideology,
or to search for a link between one of these discourses and either
Nukulaelae’s pre-contact aboriginal culture or post-missionization
religion. Yet no such patterns are evident. While colonial
authorities squeezed out of Nukulaelae and the rest of Tuvalu every
evidence of rigid hierarchy that the pre-colonial system might have
been able to offer, we know too little about political ideology and
praxis in pre-colonial days to conclude that authoritarian discourses
were post-contact introductions (even though it is commonplace for
the incorporation of egalitarian societies into a larger state system to
engender inequality and hierarchy, as demonstrated in Etienne and
Leacock (1980); Flanagan and Rayner (1988); Leacock and Lee
(1982)). For that matter, early colonial authorities were hardly dealing
with a pre-contact social order, since missionization had already
altered it fundamentally in the three decades that preceded the
beginning of the colonial era.

The reverse hypothesis, in which contemporary discourses of
nostalgia represent the pre-colonial situation, is equally difficult to
support, in that we do not know whether chiefly authority was indeed
more firmly established in pre-contact days, or whether the discourse of nostalgia is simply an instance of invented tradition without much grounding in the past. Similarly, Christianity has penetrated every aspect of Nukulaelae life since the late nineteenth century, to the extent that it is not fruitful to attempt to distinguish Christian from other types of ideology on Nukulaelae. Rationalizations based on Christian principles are offered for both authoritarianism and egalitarianism. However tempting it is to hypothesize on the origin of multiple discourses, the exercise can only remain speculative.

My analysis of leadership and authority refers specifically to Nukulaelae atoll. The question arises as to whether similar dynamics are to be found on other islands of the Tuvalu group, which share so many social and cultural traits with Nukulaelae that it makes sense to speak of 'Tuvaluan culture' (as Brady (1970) does) – although regional variations within the group cannot be neglected (cf. A. Chambers, 1983). There is evidence that tensions between an egalitarian ethos and a stratified authority structure do exist on other islands of the group. For example, Nanumea, the northernmost atoll of Tuvalu, has known in the course of its post-contact history fluctuations among various forms of chieftainship and leadership similar to those that Nukulaelae has experienced (K. Chambers, 1984: 109–26). On Nukufetau, one of the southern atolls, in 1991, young men (tamataene) contested the hourly wages they were earning for work on development projects around the atoll, principally construction of sea walls to prevent the growing problem of sea-water seepage into taro swamps and to protect the atoll from rough seas. These projects are funded through grants from the Tuvaluan Government, administered by the Island Council. When the Island Council refused to give them a pay raise, the young men went on strike. At the time of writing, work on the sea-wall is being done by able-bodied women, probably a well-calculated move on the part of the Island Council to instill shame into the young men. In retribution, the young men take no part in feasts, dancing and other events that punctuate atoll life, thereby handicapping the conduct of such events in major ways.

Similarly, parliamentary elections have given rise to serious rifts on several islands of Tuvalu. The community of Nuui, in central Tuvalu, was torn in the late 1980s by a dispute over election results, in which a defeated candidate refused to accept his defeat. Other such problems are reported for other islands of the group, and have had major consequences for their social organization. Nanumanga, in the northern part of the group, is 'traditionally' divided into four clan-like entities, called fale, literally 'house', membership of which is determined in part by residence patterns. In 1983, the village was redesignated by an American town planner funded by the Save the Children Fund. A disagreement arose among the members of one of the clans over details of the design of their part of the village. The clan failed to resolve the disagreement, and one group separated and created a fifth clan. The remaining three clans excluded both clans from community activities until they resolved the rift. In 1989 both the original fourth clan and the new clan were reintegrated into the community.

Thus the tension between egalitarianism and authoritarianism is not an exclusive feature of Nukulaelae atoll. However, it appears to be more serious on Nukulaelae than elsewhere. Why this should be so is a complex question. The social and cultural discontinuities that Nukulaelae experienced in the late nineteenth century are likely to have had a major role in the creation of multiple discourses. The tiny population of the atoll is another explanation that inhabitants of other islands of the group commonly invoke to account for the frequency of social disruptions which, in their eyes, characterize Nukulaelae life. Finally, Tuvaluans from other islands point to the obvious enjoyment that Nukulaelae people display in creating, managing, and kindling social tension as being constitutively related to the generation of ideological tensions on the atoll.

NOTES
Acknowledgments: Fieldwork on Nukulaelae was conducted in 1980–82, 1985, 1990 and 1991. The last three field sojourns, during which I gathered the data for this chapter, were funded by the National Science Foundation (grants nos. 8503061 and 8920023), the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and the Wenner Gren Foundation. Final revisions on this chapter were made while I was on a Rockefeller Fellowship at the Center for Pacific Islands Studies, University of Hawaii, in 1991–92 (the historical present in the text refers to that time). I thank the Government of Tuvalu and Nukulaelae’s Council of Elders for permission to conduct field research. Oral versions of this chapter were presented at the Raymond Firth birthday conference, and subsequently at Yale University, the University of Western Australia, and the East–West Center. Angelique Haugerud and Ali Pomponio offered copious comments on earlier versions. Additional useful advice was provided by Ivan Brady, Rick Feinberg, Michael Goldsmith, and Mac Marshall. Ideas
presented herein benefited from discussions with Alan Howard and Jan Rensel. In all cases, the usual disclaimers apply.

1 Earlier versions of this paper included a considerably richer textual body of materials than I present here. Regrettfully, much of that material had to be omitted owing to lack of space.

2 As Sahlin’s (1957) notes, such radical restructuring of all aspects of social and economic life are not uncommon on atolls of Polynesia, which are vulnerable to dramatic population changes because of their small size and exposure to the elements. In Nukulaelae’s case, restructuring was of course not solely a consequence of climatic and ecological vulnerability.

3 He appears in oral history both in 1861, when the first Christian missionary reached Nukulaelae, and in 1865, when the lease of Niuokou Islet was signed. Further confirmation that Tafalaligula was not enslaved is provided by visiting missionary Murray, who mentions that ‘the chief’ (whose name he does not provide), ‘being an old man, had been rejected by the slavers’ (1876: 382).

4 Nukulaelae genealogical memory for ascendants of every living person or every person known to living persons is normally very specific.

5 A likely area which might be expected to have been affected by history is marriage patterns. Nukulaelae society is significantly more exogamous than other islands of Tuvalu. However, this pattern has synchronic explanations: the tiny population, coupled with strong avoidance taboos between opposite-gender cousins, make avaraga ki tai, literally ‘marriage to the sea’, almost inevitable, and the lack of ‘land hunger’ (Brady, 1970, 1974) in comparison to other islands of Tuvalu poses few barriers to exogamy.

6 What I translate throughout this chapter as ‘chief’ is in fact any of several terms, some of which are used as synonyms while others characterize particular historical periods. The term aliki, cognate of terms usually translated as ‘chief’ in other Polynesian languages, appears to have been the original designator for the chiefly role; but a borrowing from Samoan, tupu, commonly rendered in English as ‘king’ (although the felicity of the gloss is debatable), is also used retroactively to refer to the chief of pre-Christian days. Nineteenth-century Western visitors commonly used the English term ‘king’ in their accounts of Nukulaelae social structure, which allowed them to deride the anarchism of a ‘king’ ruling over a few dozen subjects (e.g. David, 1899: 280–91). Today, the terms uhufema ‘head of the atoll community’ and, less frequently, uhu aliki ‘head chief’ are in common usage. Of course, whether or not one is dealing with a chiefly institution in the strict sense of the word is very much an open question.

7 The maneapa itself is an example of invented tradition in that it appears to have been introduced from the Gilbert Islands in post-mission days (Goldsmith, 1985).

8 Asad’s (1979) remark that ‘specific political economic conditions [. . .] make certain rhetorical forms objectively possible, and authoritative’ (1979: 616, emphasis in original) is particularly relevant here.

9 Transcript excerpts quoted in this chapter follow a phonemic orthography, in which double graphemes indicate geminated segments; geminated oral stops are heavily aspirated, and other geminated phonemes are articulated for a longer period of time than their ungeminated equivalents. The letter g represents a velar nasal stop, /l/ is a central flap, and all other letters have their approximate IPA value. The transcripts represent an unedited rendition of what is audible on tapes, including false starts, repairs, etc; however, volume, tempo and voice quality are not indicated here. Parentheses indicate conjectured or inaudible strings, [. . .] indicates that a string of words has been left out of the transcript, and material provided in square brackets in a translation represent additions for the sake of intelligibility which are not present in the original text. Recording references (e.g. [L&S 1991: 2:A: 024–028]) are made up of the name of the tape (L&S 1991: 2), the side of the tape (A), and tape-recorder counter references (024–028). All names that appear in transcript excerpts are pseudonyms.

10 I stress here that I invoke ‘egalitarianism’ as discourse, not as a possible type of political organization. Problems with the belief that egalitarianism is a possible political type are well known (cf. Turton, 1975: 163–5; among many others). Under closer scrutiny, all societies which have been claimed to be egalitarian have exhibited blatant patterns of inequality across groups (e.g. between women and men, between younger and older people) and within groups (see Besnier (1994) for the discussion of the culturally constructed marginalization of a Nukulaelae elder).

11 The arguments presented here are strongly reminiscent of Shore’s (1982) analysis of dissociation and ambivalence in Samoan ideologies of personhood and social action (also discussed in Shore, this volume). In a Samoan theory of social action, for example, there is room for both compliance with and rebellion against authority, and the coexistence of these ideologies, which has given rise to sharp debates amongst ethnographers, is rendered possible by a cultural conceptualization of the person as a bundle of more or less autonomous facets. I differ from Shore in viewing ‘contradiction’ as an appropriate characterization of the material I present here, maintaining, with Abu-Lughod (1991), that culture is often a system of unresolved contradictions.

12 See also Firth (1949, 1960b, 1975) for a discussion of the backstage aspects of Tikopia political process, in which individuals of non-chiefly rank exert sometimes considerable influence on chiefs.

13 The term fenua itself has telescopic meaning. Like its cognates in other Polynesian languages, its primary meaning is ‘atoll, island, country’. It is also frequently used metonymically to refer to the inhabitants of an atoll or island as a corporate, bounded group.

14 For example, David, a late-nineteenth-century visitor to Nukulaelae (although not a missionary herself), devotes a significant portion of her account of the atoll to commenting on the relative cleanliness of things and people. She thus characterizes the ‘king’ as ‘a dirty old man in a filthy shirt and kalava, with his head bound up in unclean rags’ (1899: 285), while she finds that ‘the pastor’s wife [. . .] set a splendid example of cleanliness and tidiness’ (1899: 287).

15 Donner (1988) discusses the association between toddy drinking and egalitarian ideology on Sikaiana atoll. While evidence that this link also exists on Nukulaelae is more tenuous because drinking on Nukulaelae and Sikaiana have different characteristics, the Sikaiana case offers an interesting comparison.

16 Awareness of the concept of human rights was awakened on Nukulaelae in large part by the establishment in the mid-1980s of a People’s Lawyer on Funafuti. In 1990, the People’s Lawyer’s office published and distributed
widely a booklet in Tuvalu entitled *Ko Koe mo te Tufafooda* 'You and the Law', from which many Nukulaelae Islanders learned that human rights are protected by Tuvalu’s constitution. However, the country’s constitution also calls for the protection of *taumono oaganu* 'customs and traditions', leaving much unresolved in cases where what is perceived to fall under the rubric of ‘customs and traditions’ (e.g. authoritarian control by the Council of Elders) is in direct conflict with human rights.

17 *Fatapi fakaliʻi* is a genre of conflict-management talk in which conflicts are talked out in a calm, therapeutic manner (hence *fakaliʻi* properly). See Besnier (1990a).

18 A Marxist understanding of structure as a structure of contradiction is better suited than other models to account for the Nukulaelae material. However, the lack of a clear pattern of distribution of the contradictory discourses across independently identifiable segments of the Nukulaelae population casts some doubts on the appropriateness of a classic Marxist account to these materials.

REFERENCE


Goldsmith, Michael (1985) ‘Transformations of the meeting-house in Tuvalu’ in

— (1989) 'Church and society in Tuvalu', PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.


