

LANGUAGE AND AFFECT

Niko Besnier

Department of Anthropology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520

KEY WORDS: emotions and linguistic behavior, affect and gender, affect and social structure, language and ethnography, linguistic anthropology.

INTRODUCTION

In a seminal overview of semantics, Lyons (294) breaks down the notion of “linguistic meaning” into three components: *descriptive* meaning (frequently termed “referential,” “propositional,” “notional,” or “denotative”)—i.e. the mapping of linguistic signs onto the entities and processes they describe; *social* meaning, consisting of the social categories (gender, social class, ethnicity, situation, etc) represented in language; and *expressive* (or “affective” or “emotive”) meaning, representing the speaker’s or writer’s feelings, moods, dispositions, and attitudes toward the propositional content of the message and the communicative context. Variants of this model have been proposed by such authors as Malinowski (296), Sapir (364), Jespersen (242), Bühler (81), Bally (19), Ullman (426), Firth (138), and members of the Prague School (155, 362, 433, 434), although details of conceptualization can diverge significantly from author to author. For example, what other writers call “affect” is subsumed in Halliday’s functional model (182, 183) in part by the interpersonal (i.e. that through which “social groups are delimited, and the individual is identified and reinforced,” 182:143) and in part by the textual (that which gives coherence to discourse). Similarly, affect straddles several categories in Jakobson’s model of language functions (235; cf 91). In addition, not all writers agree that “meaning” and “semantic” are appropriate labels for affective components of language (e.g. 275, 445).

A strict distinction among referential, social, and affective meanings rests

on several assumptions. First, meaning must be seen as a unidirectional mapping from a predefined reality onto arbitrary linguistic forms (cf 172, 188). Second, cognition and emotion (and associated notions, such as subjectivity-objectivity, rationality-irrationality, etc; cf 289) must be assumed to be dichotomous. Third, where such a distinction is strictly adhered to, meaning is also attributed to the language producer; thus affective meaning is seen as the encoding of the speaker's emotions, which the interlocutor decodes in verbal messages by giving precedence to intentionality (e.g. 175, 380, 405). A related assumption is that emotions are internal events, the property of the individual. Probably as a direct result of these various assumptions, models where the trichotomy is emphasized have commonly regarded affect as too slippery an area of language for "scientific" investigation. Apart from investigations of more obvious affect-encoding devices like onomatopoeias and diminutives, there has been little work in orthodox linguistics on affective dimensions of language. Mainstream linguists define referential meaning as their area of inquiry, and sociolinguists have made headway in understanding how language interlocks with various social processes (152). But affect has been consistently set aside as an essentially unexplorable aspect of linguistic behavior, a residual category to which aspects of language that cannot be handled conveniently with extant linguistic models were relegated to be forgotten.

Recent developments in the anthropological understanding both of emotional life (reviewed in 293) and of the relationship between language and sociocultural context (see 33, 67, 101, 152, 185, 231, 338, 372 for pertinent reviews) have caused many of the assumptions underlying structure-oriented linguistic positions on affect to be seen as problematic. Linguistic anthropologists have demonstrated that the relationship between linguistic signs and reality is not a one-way mapping but rather a complex constitutive linkage (65, 70, 178, 207, 208, 222, 223, 232, 233). Ethnographic work on emotions has shown that the opposition between cognition and emotion is a Western construct (5, 109, 243, 282, 287, 289, 290), thereby casting doubt on the validity of a referential-affective dichotomy. Similarly, attributing the ownership of meaning to the individual has proved considerably less useful in the analysis of the anthropological material than a "dialogic" position (207, 216) in which meaning is constructed in interactional processes (33, 117, 122, 212, 395).

Taking these findings as a point of departure, linguistic anthropologists have in recent years begun to pay closer attention to the role of affect in language. Guiding this trend are two traditions of inquiry: anthropologically informed work on language acquisition, where it has been found that, in many cultures, affect plays a central role in language socialization, and vice versa (72, 102, 103, 323, 324, 326, 328, 329, 369–371, 373; reviewed in 372); and

ethnographic research on poetics and performance (reviewed in 33), phenomena whose links to affect are numerous and complex. Armed with a culturally sensitive approach to the relationships among language, emotion, and their sociocultural context, scholars have redefined the problems posed by affect in language and pursued their inquiry into hitherto unexplored areas. This review evaluates progress made to date in understanding this research, with an eye on how it may complement and be complemented by cultural anthropological perspectives on emotional processes.

A note on scope and another on terminology: First, space limitations preclude an overview of the important topic of nonverbal communication and its relationship to verbal categories. Although some aspects of nonverbal affect are touched on here, the vast literature on nonverbal aspects of affect (cf 125, 126 for recent surveys) generally stems from a tradition of inquiry very different from that represented here. Second, the term “affect” is here given a broad sense, subsuming other categories that are sometimes distinguished from affect. Psychological and folk models in the West distinguish among *feelings*, a broad category of person-centered psychophysiological sensations, *emotion*, a subset of particularly “visible” and “identifiable” feelings, and *affect*, the subjective states that observers ascribe to a person on the basis of the person’s conduct (246). In addition, an individual’s propensity to exhibit particular emotions is commonly viewed as a defining factor for *personality* (343), a premise that the (scant) literature on language and personality appears to take as a given (137, 147, 149, 364, 366). [Two related categories, *mood* (359) and *attitude* (85), also play an important, if equivocal, role in Western psychological discourse.] Most anthropologists view this categorization with at least some suspicion, in that it subsumes a Western ideology of self and person (4, 5, 11, 290, 293). The cross-cultural validity of the distinction between “feeling” and “emotion” is an empirical question (but see 2, 3), and while ethnographers rely in large part on concepts of emotion to arrive at a sense of how the person is defined in particular societies, cross-cultural variation in the definition of both “emotion” and “person” warrant care in assigning a precise universal correlation between them. Care must be taken not to adopt Western taxonomies of psychological processes as analytic tools in investigations of how language is interwoven with the psychological makeup of self and society, and adopting a broad (but malleable) definition of “affect” can be seen as a wise empirical stance.

THE LOCUS OF AFFECT IN LANGUAGE

A multichannel phenomenon, affect floods linguistic form on many different levels of structure in many different ways. This section is a selective survey of findings on the question of where affect can be located in language behavior.

Illustrated here is the wide variety of affective devices available in the structure of different languages and speech communities, and the prevalence of affect in all aspects of linguistic structure. In essence, the task of writing a “grammar” of affect is equivalent to describing the structure and use of a language.

That affect is an important component of the lexicon is well documented (for a bibliography of relevant work, see 105). The affective meaning of lexical items, commonly referred to as their *connotation*, became the subject of work in psychology in the late 1950s with Osgood’s attempt to find universal patterns of affective associations (332). While this line of work was quickly found to be fraught with problems (e.g. 355, 445), it opened a new vista on the notion of “lexical meaning,” which has since been investigated by concentrating on narrower problems. The area of the lexicon in which affect is the most salient comprises emotion words (cf 293 for a review), but many other lexical fields have clear affective dimensions of meaning. A rich domain for the investigation of affect in the lexicon would include descriptors for groups and individuals and the various strategies that can be used in addressing or referring to participants in communicative events. For example, van Dijk (435) shows that Dutch speakers’ descriptive and not necessarily derogatory terms for immigrants are carriers and reinforcers of ethnic prejudice (cf also 305). As Foucault (142) emphasizes, labels have powerful consequences. These consequences are evident in political rhetoric (cf papers in 50, 65, 70, 335 and review in 338), where in many cultures the “moralizing” function of persuasive language (82, 83) is brought out in particularly vivid ways. Affect also plays a role in the very definition of some lexical fields. Regardless of wine tasters’ normative assertions, wine descriptors have such imprecise referential meanings that their use is more successfully captured in affective terms: Their primary function is to construct wine tasters’ presentation of self and create phatic communion (277).

Address terms, kinship terms, and pronouns often have a clear affective dimension: from the complex address-form systems found in languages such as Javanese (130) to “inversions” of vocative kin terms (e.g. mothers in rural Italy affectionately addressing their offspring with *mamma*; cf 63). Pronominal paradigms offer rich opportunities for affect displays. T/V-pronoun systems consist of two or more alternative pronoun forms (most commonly in the second person), some of which are more “polite” than others (64, 78, 79, 131, 193). As Friedrich’s (146) analysis of T/V choices in Russian novels shows, these paradigmatic alternatives are exploited for a complex web of social and affective purposes. In some languages (e.g. Samoan and Tongan) one finds a diminutive form of the first-person singular pronoun (324), historically derived from a plural form, that can be used to elicit empathy and mark self-deprecation. (There are also special articles with the same mean-

ing.) In languages that do not provide these paradigmatic resources, pronouns can be equally pregnant with affect. Witness the different dispositions associated with the “institutional” pronoun *we* and its alternatives in English (430). In languages that allow clauses to appear with no overt subject and/or direct object (reference being encoded in the verb morphology, or being recoverable extratextually), whether or not to name particular participants can provide ways of controlling the affective deployment of discourse (cf 226:377 for examples from Native North American narratives, and 119 on pronouns in Italian middle-class conversation). Where honorific forms and structures are particularly salient, as in Western Polynesia (121) and Java (130), such forms frequently become incorporated in the affect-display repertoire of speech-community members.

Lexical processes like synecdoche and metonymy are frequently involved in the manipulation of affective meaning (148, 336). Other metaphorical processes have important affective dimensions, as even universalism-seeking research on metaphor recognizes (256, 257, 268:380–415, 269, 270). In many cultures, talk *about* emotional processes is replete with metaphors. For example, members of many speech communities have a propensity to use somatic metaphors (e.g. “my liver is angry” or “the heart is weak”) when talking about emotions; the pattern is particularly prevalent in the Pacific (43, 272, 280, 281, 348, 352, 353, 402), but it is also witnessed in Elizabethan England (53). Many scholars, tacitly assuming a constitutive relationship between linguistic and cultural categories, point to these metaphorical patterns as evidence for a somatic conceptualization of emotion in these societies (but see 198 and 249 for words of caution). Of course, if these linguistic patterns are indeed symptoms of emotions being “felt” as bodily sensations, they are not metaphors at all in the conventional sense of the term (cf 24). In other cultural contexts, speakers talk about emotions as organically inseparable from the social acts they engender and situations in which they are found (196, 197, 251, 252, 276, 286, 288, 290, 312). In some cultural contexts, emotions are conceptualized as internal events; such is the case of contemporary middle-class American society (89, 112, 243, 437). Elsewhere, individuals “undergo” emotional sensations; in Samoan, for example, the experiencer of certain emotions is frequently encoded as a locative modifier of the emotion-denoting verb, rather than its grammatical subject (158, 326, 390; the same pattern is attested in Yiddish and Kaluli; cf 410). Clearly, preferred ways of talking about emotions and emotional life offer rich opportunities for exploration of the underlying categories and normative views associated with them.

Certain marginal areas of the vocabulary of many languages, such as ideophones (i.e. words, not necessarily onomatopoeic, whose phonological structure itself encodes meanings) and onomatopoeias (20, 38, 108, 141, 150,

260, 360, 361), exclamations, expletives, interjections, curses, insults, and imprecations (9, 10, 113, 164, 190, 201, 237, 298, 310, 425) are rich in affective meaning. Shona ideophones, for example, have been described as “dramatizations of actions or states” (260:20). Descriptive linguists chronically neglect these categories but nevertheless point to them whenever “affect” is invoked. The fact that they exhibit unusual formal features, such as deviant stress patterns and phonological segments not found elsewhere in the lexicon, is well documented, but the parameters of their use in context are not.

Related to ideophones is what is commonly referred to as *sound symbolism* (reviewed in 427; it is not clear that “symbolism” is the appropriate semiotic descriptor). Much work on this topic has been devoted, with debatable success (cf 426), to uncovering universal correlations between particular sounds and concepts (e.g. [i] and “smallness”). Although often left undiscussed, the semiotic association between form and meaning would fall under the rubric of affect. That certain sounds have affective meaning is well established for certain languages (cf references on ideophones above), but most clear cases are highly language specific. Cocopa narrators substituted certain consonants for others when impersonating or talking about mythical animals (273); comparable patterns are found in other languages of Native North America, although these devices mark emotional distance in other languages (225, 226).

Certain categories of meaning like evidentiality (i.e. encoded markers of the epistemological status of utterances), which may be conveyed through a variety of linguistic means (97), are often saturated with affective connotation (162, 189, 191). In some languages, evidentiality is grammaticalized: The Japanese sentence-final particle *no* indicates whether communicators speak as members of a group or as individuals (106, 107). Speakers of other languages have to rely on lexical strategies to convey evidential meaning. In English, adverbs like *obviously*, *plainly*, and *allegedly* (47), hedging (e.g. *perhaps*, *sort of*, *loosely speaking*; 247, 267, 375), intensity (e.g. *very*, *really*; 264), as well as discourse markers (e.g. *well*, *you know*; 333, 374, 375) encode affective stance. Diminutive and augmentative affixes in Indo-European and Amerindian languages indicate sympathy, endearment, emotional closeness, or antipathy, condescension, and emotional distance (e.g. 225, 407, 439). Reduplication (e.g. Italian *un borghese piccolo piccolo* “a small, small citizen”; 448), quantifiers (e.g. *most*, *many*), and comparative constructions (156) can be added to the list. Many categories commonly associated with inflectional morphology can also carry affective meaning; for example: mood (e.g. variations between conditionals and indicatives in Romance languages; 274), modality (e.g. the English auxiliaries *must* and *will*, whose affective meanings are historically derived from their deontic meanings; 421, 422; cf also 156), and case marking (e.g. agentive noun phrases marked for ergative, oblique, or genitive case in Samoan; 123).

Many syntactic features are exploited for affective purposes. Various ways of constructing negative clauses in many languages allow language users to exploit logical presupposition and give certain elements the status of shared knowledge for affective purposes (218). The transitivity valency of clauses may be manipulated to place in the foreground certain events and participants, and subtly to assign blame and identify the consequences of actions (217). Active-passive alternatives in many languages (e.g. *the opposition accused the government* vs *the government was accused by the opposition*; 49, 144, 259, 349, 423) align speaker, hearer, and events along different axes of identification, which some linguists call “empathy” (261, 262). In some languages, such as Japanese (219, 420), a separate passive construction is reserved for events perceived as having an adverse effect on the grammatical patient. In Tuvaluan, a Polynesian language, a similar effect is obtained by adding an ergatively marked argument to an intransitive verb (39). Nominalization (e.g. *picketing curtailed coal production*; 259) and other structure-altering processes also affect point of view. Depersonalization and affective distance can be communicated in impersonal constructions (e.g. *it will be shown that this hypothesis is incorrect*), agentless passives, or pronoun deletion in many languages. Such structures as inversion (e.g. *and down he went into the ditch*), left-dislocation (e.g. *that man, I can't stand him*; 124), topicalization, focusing (230), clefting of various types (e.g. *What I really feel like is a cup of tea*; 345), and word-order variations in languages with relatively free word order are commonly assigned an “information packaging” function in descriptive linguistics (93, 140, 184), but they also carry affective meaning. In at least two languages, English (135) and Tuvaluan (41), raising rules (e.g. *John seems to have left* vs *It seems that John has left*) allow the speaker to subtly focus the responsibility (and often blame) for events onto particular participants. (The affective dimensions of other complex-sentence constructions are discussed in 56.) By increasing and decreasing the textual distance between selected elements of the discourse, these devices contribute to textuality (i.e. “the quality of coherence or connectivity that characterizes text”; 185:96); but they also juxtapose certain elements, thus creating complex affective relationships between them (115). They provide language users with the tools for creating particular affective worlds in narratives and other expositions.

The complex systems of acoustic phenomena that we perceive as intonation reign as a prime, and notoriously multifunctional, locus of affect (13, 55, 57, 58, 265, 266). Experimental evidence (e.g. 278, 318, 368) indicates that language users have difficulties assigning or agreeing on affective interpretation to decontextualized utterances solely on the basis of intonational cues; linguists do not fare much better. Other affect-encoding suprasegmental phenomena include tone raising in some West African languages (35), whose sole purpose is to mark high affect of various kinds; segment gemination;

aspiration (367); voice quality (230); volume (233); speed (45); and pitch (304). Nonphonemic vowel nasalization in Yokuts, a language of California, serves a variety of affective functions (319:238).

There are important affective dimensions to discourse strategies, to the organization of information, and, generally, to “ways of speaking” (224, 386). Quotes, recreations of one’s own and others’ speech, and other types of replaying activities (163:530) are affectively charged, in that they interweave the voices of different social entities and the replayer’s moral agenda (18, 440). They may mark the speaker’s or writer’s emotional involvement in the text, enhance the heteroglossic nature of discourse, and subtly leak the reporter’s stance on the replayed situation (20–22, 32, 169, 295, 369, 415, 416, 431). Replaying may also have the opposite effect, that of creating distance between the reporter and the quoted message, as when the Shuar engage in ceremonial dialogs, a genre associated with a tradition from which they have become alienated (161), or when American life-story narrators present themselves in a negative light in past events (283). A striking case of exploitation of different voices in discourse is the hiring of a griot in rural Wolof society to praise or insult someone, which allows the hirer’s affect to remain decorously flat (230, 233). On the Polynesian atoll of Nukulaelae, the authors of gossip narratives employ various devices to delay the identification of “victims” in their narratives with various advantageous consequences, among which figure the multiplication of opportunities for the introduction of different descriptors with negative connotation and the reinforcement of collusion between participants (44; on collusion and affect, see also 163, 168, 170, 302). In multilingual communities, code switching offers fertile ground for affect work. Switches from one language to the other exploit the affective connotation of each language, particularly where a marked prestige differential exists between varieties (51, 151, 180, 192, 200). Even the direction of the switch can act as an affective key: A switch from Spanish to English displays a sterner, angrier attitude than the opposite switch when a Mexican-American mother talks to a child (180:92).

At the convergence of affective and poetic dimensions of language (33), genres, speech-act types, and performance styles can be affectively charged. Poetic devices like parallelisms of various types (e.g. 236, 429) illustrate this. Proverbs among older Spanish speakers in the American Southwest serve a complex array of functions, ranging from a validation of the speaker’s credibility to a negotiation of the social relationship between participants (71, 73). Mexican-Americans in Texas express complex feelings toward their own ethnic identity, and their resentment of the encroachment of values from the dominant culture, in satirical stories that ridicule and stereotype the Anglo-American (337). Satires of the affective style of members of a dominant group, best documented by Basso for the Western Apache (25), are common protest mechanisms among socially disadvantaged groups (12). More or less

ritualized insults, boasts, and other genres of (often competitive) verbal play, of the type that young Black Americans (30, 171, 255, 263, 279, 309), Turkish boys (118), and members of many other groups engage in (1, 69, 154; reviewed in 67), have complex affective functions. Such genres may be bracketed by various affective signals. Western Apache spoofs of the "Whiteman" are loud and exuberant, in contrast to everyday interactions (25), and Black American "marking" is frequently accompanied by switches from Black English to standard English (308). In many cultures, poetic genres are associated with emotionality: North Yemeni performers, for example, view their highly controlled and formalized poetic duels as the most appropriate locus of affect, one where emotions like anger may be displayed for creative, rather than destructive, purposes (92). Poetry may be laminated into another event: Witness Tzotzil speakers "breaking out" into couplets to express anger or respect (191). In both performance and more mundane contexts, claims to the floor and challenges to these claims in competitive verbal performance (169, 171, 392) establish certain social structures among speaker, audience, and narrated events but also establish complex affective relationships among these various elements.

Affective meaning can also be conveyed by such communicative activities as laughing and weeping. In many societies, laughter, whose co-occurrence with verbal interaction is carefully timed, serves as a distancing mechanism between its producer (whether speaker or recipient) and co-occurring events; the distance is often expressed in an emotional reaction such as embarrassment in middle-class Britain and the United States (194, 238–241) or shame on the Melanesian atoll of Nissan (317). Among Italian-Americans, laughter serves as an emotion-management strategy to deflect ethnic prejudices (114:164). Weeping in Mexicano (Nahuatl) narratives is a carefully controlled index which, used at crucial moments in the thematic deployment of the discourse, defines both the narrator's affective state and her relationship with her audience (209). Thus the micro-organization of talk and nontalk can in itself serve as a vehicle for affect. Likewise silence (7, 23, 26, 31, 417), withdrawal (37), inarticulateness and dysfluency (7, 210, 233, 301), the unstated (208, 424), and the understated (44, 45, 438) signify a broad range of affective experiences in many societies and contexts. For the Western Apache, for whom an expressive utterance consists of as much meaning packed into as little form as possible (27), silence may communicate a strong emotional experience (23, 26). In Shakespearean representations of Elizabethan culture, silence is also associated with a broad range of sensations, including such antonymic pairs as alienation and intimacy, joy and grief (52). Again, the multifunctionality is extensive.

The affective functions of many nonverbal devices demonstrate how affective meaning is constructed interactionally (44, 120, 166, 357). For example, in many cultures, the success of singing performances depends on the au-

dience's affective response; such is the case for song performances among the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea, which can move listeners to tears (136), and among the Gê-speaking Suyá, which move some to tears and others to euphoria (382). Even in contexts where audiences are allowed no or very few claims to the floor, their affective response can have a major impact on the deployment of discourse. A case in point is applause in political speech-making in postindustrial societies, which requires close coordination between the speaker and the audience and can influence the deployment of the co-occurring discourse (14, 15, 203, 204). Furthermore, an affective display can be a group affair. In poetic duels at Yemeni wedding celebrations, performers frequently present their spontaneous compositions as responses to strong emotions, which are as likely to be seated in the group as they are in the individual (92).

This brief survey has shown that affective meaning may be conveyed through a broad range of linguistic and communicative devices. However, there are significant differences among various manifestations of affect. In probably all speech communities, emotions can be described (e.g. *I hate him*), although such overt avowals in the first person are likely to be associated with rather marked situations. More commonly, emotions are alluded to, and the decoding task is a process of "reading off" complex covert messages (284). But nondescriptive affective signs are not uniformly covert or "transparent" (398). Interjections, for example, convey affective messages more overtly than, say, intonation. Interjections can stand as independent linguistic units and hence are potentially more on-record than intonation, which is not segmentable. At the same time, more transparent means of encoding affect are also frequently less efficient. For example, the perceived primary purpose of the syntactic structure of a sentence is to communicate referential meaning: which referential entity is the agent, which is the patient, etc. If an affective component is superposed on this referential function, it will be processed by the recipient at the same time as the referential component, and will come "for free." In contrast, an affective interjection does not play a significant referential role, and thus will be perceived solely as an affect-encoding device. In the first example, affect is likely to be processed less consciously than in the second example, and often lies outside of participants' limits of awareness (397–399, 432); language users are sometimes unconscious of using even very "noticeable" affect-carrying linguistic devices, like discourse markers (444). Not surprisingly, affect is most commonly expressed covertly in natural discourse.

THE SEMIOTIC STATUS OF AFFECTIVE MEANING

As illustrated in the previous section, descriptive linguistics has not been very successful in assigning exact affective meanings to linguistic structures. Most

characterizations make do with general notions like emotional intensity (e.g. involvement vs detachment) or directionality (e.g. focus of empathy), or with labels like “positive” and “negative” affect. The difficulties with transcending this level of generality are frequently explained as resulting from the extreme multifunctionality of many affect-encoding linguistic categories. A particular intonation contour, for example, can have different meaning in different contexts, some referential, others affective; even the more “solidly” affective areas of language, like adjectives denoting emotions, seem to have an uncanny propensity for developing a wide range of meanings through metaphorical extension (6). This section takes these difficulties as a point of departure for an inquiry into the semiotic status of affect in language.

As noted earlier, some aspects of communication are privileged as loci of affective meaning. For example, intonation is universally utilized as a primary affective key; multiple second-person pronoun forms often differ from one another in terms of affect; and, in many languages, many address terms have affective connotations. It is notable that these features of language are also privileged loci for indexicality, both referential and nonreferential (130, 234, 396). This predilection for indexical vehicles is no coincidence: Most linguistic affect is itself a metamessage (28). Thus the bewildering multifunctionality of many affective signs can be explained in terms of their semiotic nature. In contrast to the arbitrary and self-contained symbols that post-Saussurean linguists have come to expect in language, indexical vehicles only have meaning when embedded in a context (339). An affective sign may index several affective experiences ambiguously, or different categories in different situations. For language users, the multifunctionality of affective devices is often a communicative resource, rather than a problem. Because they may signal more than one referent, and often more than just affect, affect-laden structures are particularly useful when ambiguity is a useful or necessary communicative strategy (116); indeterminacy itself becomes a communicative resource. An approach to language as an object divorceable from its context is ill-equipped for an investigation of affective dimensions of language (178).

Affective indexes and indexical symbols (or shifters) are related to affectivity in culturally mediated ways. They conjure not a universal set of emotional categories, as tacitly assumed in descriptive linguistics, but rather culturally constructed categories. Indeed, certain indexes presuppose different facets of affectivity in different cultures. For example, dysfluency and stuttering are associated with low-affect interactive styles among the Wolof (233), but with displays of high affect among the Barundi (7), although in each case these features must probably co-occur with other linguistic indexes for the desired results to obtain. Clearly, cross-cultural variability in the relationship between particular affective keys and emotion categories is likely to be extensive. An understanding of affect in language cannot proceed without a concurrent

investigation of the nature of these categories and of their place in social life.

Frequently recognized as an empirical problem is the question of multiple keys. Since affect can be displayed at many different levels of linguistic structure, individuals can give out contradictory signals on different levels, as Bateson (29) documented in his pioneering work on double-binding and schizophrenia. *I love you* can be uttered with an aggressive tone of voice (and angry face) that contradicts the literal meaning of the sentence. Such disjunctions are exploited (probably universally) in sarcasm and irony (12, 28, 163, 315), which themselves have affective functions in interaction (356). Different affective indexes can also key contradictory meanings (e.g. "excited" intonation co-occurring with "uninvolved" syntax). Conflicts between keys can be syntagmatic (e.g. across utterances or turns at speaking) or paradigmatic (e.g. intonation "contradicting" propositional content; 131, 230, 329). Researchers from various traditions of inquiry (e.g. 206, 221, 294, 363) have suggested that whenever keys contradict one another, such keys as intonation and facial expressions (i.e. the more nonreferential indexical signs) override other signs.

The problem of channel disjunction can be more broadly contextualized in what Irvine calls the "sincerity problem" (230): How do members of different social groups distinguish "true" from "deceitful" affective displays ("exuded expressions" from "guided doings," to use Goffman's terminology; 163)? The distinction between "true" and "feigned" displays of emotion requires that at least two assumptions be made: that emotions as individual experiences be differentiated from emotions as interactional constructs; and that the attribution of intentionality be central to the interpretation of human behavior. Neither of these assumptions is cross-culturally universal. While an "inside-outside" contrast seems to underlie ethnotheories of emotion in many cultures (230), the contrast is not necessarily seen as an important ingredient of explanations for emotionality (e.g. 250, 390). Similarly, there are cultures (e.g. Samoa; 122, 390) in which a person's intentions are not a relevant issue in accounting for social action, including emotion displays. Rather, moral assessments are made on the basis of the goodness of fit between social context and action. Further, as Urban (432) shows for ritualized wailing in South America, the relationship between "real" emotions and affective displays is a cultural construct; as long as members of a culture "agree" to match particular emotion labels to particular displays, and as long as this agreement remains tacit, the display is sincere. On the basis of these observations, the original question can be more fruitfully restated as follows: To what extent is the distinction between "true" and "deceitful" affect relevant to members of particular groups? How members of cultures for which the answer to this question is a negative one account for "mixed" affective displays of the type exhibited in irony remains to be investigated.

LANGUAGE, AFFECT, AND SOCIAL SITUATION

A tripartite distinction among referential, social, and affective meaning was noted above. While the discussion up to this point has touched on the problems and prospects of the referential-affective contrast, little has been said about the social-affective contrast, to which the rest of this review is devoted. As current anthropological research on emotionality has shown convincingly, emotions and social life are intricately interwoven, which immediately sheds some doubt on the validity of a sharp dividing line between the social and the affective. In this and in subsequent sections, it will be shown that linguistic affect mediates the constitutive relationships among such concepts as situationality, gender, class, ethnicity, and language. While an absolute dichotomy between affective and social meanings is not useful, one must nevertheless recognize that not all social meaning is affective. The linguistic representation of power relations, for example, does not always have affective dimensions.

The ways members of all cultures manage affect, linguistic or extralinguistic, can vary greatly from one context to another. Not only do different social contexts call for different emotion displays, but the "same" emotion can be displayed variously across different contexts. Middle-class American norms prescribe that grief be displayed through weeping in certain public contexts, such as funerals (particularly by women), although such displays are "optional" in more private contexts. Among the Ilongot, public oratorical debates require active participants to "slow down" their emotions and control outbursts of affective displays (352:177–220). In contrast, Black American Baptist services involve dramatic affective displays (303). In fact, members of many societies identify situations *in terms of* the amount and kind of affect that can appropriately be displayed (40, 229, 233). But affect is never absent from an interactional context, even though certain situations may be described as if it were. In contexts where communicative norms call for "flat" affect, for depersonalization (391), or for a change in footing from author to animator (163, 165), utterances are permeated with "the emotionally distinctive aura of affectlessness" (164:813). Such is the case of Javanese *krama* ("polite") speech levels (129, 130), in which indexicality is structurally muted; such is also the case in Western academic writing. In British academic writing, for example, lexical and grammatical markers of stance are relatively infrequent (47), a symptom of the devaluation of the writer's visibility in that context. Facelessness is frequently "normalized," explained as having a "natural" affinity with the context (379): For example, organized skepticism, universalism, and disinterestedness are believed to reign in Western academic discourse (159, 313, 346, 358), and muted affect is but another symptom of this belief. Of course, academic discourse is still infused with affect, perhaps less overtly than other discourses; linguistic devices are available to travesty

affect as “reason” or to subtly shift the major burden of an affective response onto the audience (17). Academics’ folk beliefs about the affectlessness of their discourse are deeply embedded in social hegemonies; whether or not one is able to participate successfully in conventionalized academic discourse is a criterion for access to institutional power (132, 258, 346, 449) and to symbolic capital (61, 62).

Many cultures bracket certain situations as contexts in which emotionality and affect are to be acted out or thematized. For example, affect is a key topic of discussion in the therapeutic encounters of postindustrial societies. The therapist focuses the patient’s attention on affective dimensions of the encounter itself or of narratives provided by the patient; emotion-labelling, emotion-term glossing, and negotiations of the meaning of emotion terms (usually under the covert control of the therapist; 111) are common activities in Western therapy (80, 90, 128, 277, 265, 342, 418, 450) and comparable events in preindustrial societies (e.g. 66 and papers in 443). An ethnographer of communication would first pose the following questions: How do members of the group frame events in which emotions can be talked about? What role do these events play in the social life of the community, and what triggers them? Investigations of the emic definition of such contexts have provided important insights into the role of emotion in the social life of many groups (443). There are thus complex patterns of relative “distancing” across context. In some situations, such as Western-style therapy, affect is the focus of talk; in others, participants are expected to display excited interest in the situation, but cannot give prominence to personal emotions (e.g. 133, 134).

Particular attention has been paid in the ethnographic literature to contexts where “ritualized” emotion displays, such as wailing and weeping, are called for. Wailing and weeping, genres that are usually gendered and that typically consist of vowel sounds intoned with restricted pitch variation, are viewed in many cultures as maximally iconic expressions of grief (136, 173, 386, 428) and sometimes of joy, as among the Shavante and Tapirapé of Brazil (173, 441). Urban’s (432) comparative analysis shows that ritual wailing in South America may have various forms and semiotic functions: When it accompanies bereavement, its form is iconic of the feelings it expresses; in greeting ceremonials, it takes on a more stylized and controlled form, serves as an index of “meta-affect,” and marks a desire for sociability.

The relationship between modality (i.e. speaking vs writing) and affect remains largely unexplored, although the sociolinguistic literature on orality and literacy frequently alludes to affective categories. For example, it is commonly assumed that spoken language is universally more “involved,” “emotional,” and better suited for emotion representation (as opposed to presentation) than written language. Textual evidence commonly advanced in support of this is the greater incidence in spoken language of such features as

pronouns and questions, markers of personal involvement (46, 94–96, 411, 413; reviewed in 98). The assumption is made that the participants in a spoken (particularly face-to-face) interaction are more prone to becoming “emotional” than readers and writers. However, most of these claims have been supported with data from contemporary mainstream Western contexts, where writing is viewed as being less “subjective,” less “emotional,” and generally more “reliable” than speaking (195, 285, 350, 408, 409). The literacy practices associated with academia and other loci of cultural reproduction are particularly prone to such characterizations (75, 159), as noted above. That these views merely constitute the ideological construction of Western, school-oriented, middle-class-dominated literacy is suggested by the cross-cultural evidence. For example, on Nukulaelae atoll (Central Pacific), participants in literate activities are expected to display affect (42, 43), this characteristic constituting the context of literacy practices in Nukulaelae society. Even in Western settings, writers of such products as direct-sale letters exploit affective strategies for audience manipulation (145); yet these contexts are no less written-like than other practices involving writing (cf 314 for comparable remarks on professional letters exchanged by scientists). Thus affect defines modality of communication as yet another manifestation of symbolic capital, and does not correlate in any simple manner with mode of interaction.

An interesting case of emergent tensions among affect displays, their folk accounts, and normative control surrounds electronic communication in post-industrial societies. Since its appearance in the early 1980s, e-mail has had to develop new norms of social and linguistic interaction, based on a complex combination of norms from kindred spoken and written interactional contexts. At the same time, attempts to exert normative control have emerged in the process of the medium’s being integrated into preexisting sociopolitical dynamics, in the form of etiquette memos circulated by computer centers and electronic bulletin boards. Affect has figured prominently in these various developments. E-messages indeed have a more “emotional” texture than other types of discourse (253), as witnessed by the prevalence of *emoticons* [overt affective keys—e.g. “:-)” to mark irony or “upbeat” emotions, “:-&” for “tongue-tied”, and *flames* (verbal attacks on public electronic forums).] Folk models explain these features as a “natural” adaptation to the technological characteristics of the medium, and normative discourse targets them as disruptive of academic social order.

Affect thus permeates all utterances across all contexts because the voices of social beings, and hence their affect, can never be extinguished from the discourse (18, 391, 431, 440). To use Bakhtin’s apt phrase, utterances are “ideologically saturated” (18:271). However, this ideology may take on different guises across communicative contexts, and these guises may in turn

help define the social and structural features of each communicative context, its location in the group's repertoire of contexts, and its role in the group's social and political structure.

LANGUAGE, AFFECT, AND GENDER

That emotions and their management play a pivotal role in the cultural construction of gender identity is amply documented in work on gender in anthropology and neighboring disciplines (99, 100, 211, 227, 245, 291, 292, 330, 331, 351, 404). Not surprisingly, affect also holds an important, if unacknowledged, position in research on gender and culture. In many autochthonous discourses, women and men are said to differ in the frequency, the intensity, and the type of affect they express in interaction. For example, among the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea, female children are expected to be affectively steadier than male children, who are seen as less predictable (371). Anger-like emotions are normatively associated with men in Samoan and Ilongot societies (158, 352) but with women among the Fiji Indians (68).

Investigations of gender and language focused on Western settings generally agree to recognize gendering in emotional performance, although there is little consensus on the characteristics of this gendering. In postindustrial settings, women are often characterized as more emotionally extravagant, communicatively indirect, and solidarity seeking than men (76, 77, 104, 271, 300, 344, 403, 419; reviewed in 299, 340, 387). Linguistic evidence provided in support of these views includes women's exploitation of a wider pitch range than men, their frequent use of tag questions and hedges [assumed to convey attitudinal insecurity (271, 394, 244)], and their frequent use of affect-enhancing linguistic indexes such as intensifying adverbs and modals (76, 77). Women are also perceived as willing consumers of heavily affective discourse—an expectation that certain genres, like the romance, exploit (347). Hochschild (211) sees women's affect-laden communicative style in middle-class America as intimately linked to their limited access to power and economic resources. Socialized to engage in more "emotion management" than men, women are thus predisposed for low-status service employment in which positive affective displays are privileged; these displays exclude them from the competition for more powerful and gainful roles. But other work has found problems with the association of women and highly affective styles. For middle-class Western groups, the evidence is at best equivocal. For example, tag questions have many meanings, which depend on linguistic and extralinguistic factors such as social dialects and power differentials (8, 86, 87, 214, 322). Even the presence of significant pitch differences between women and men is controversial (202).

The relationship between gender and affect has also been shown to take on

very different characteristics across social classes and cultures (299, 341, 387). For example, in some societies, women are expected to be silent, taciturn, or affectively flat in unmarked contexts, while men are voluble and display much affect (e.g. 205, 248, 334). In many societies, women can only express affect (and sometimes have a public voice at all) in specially bracketed situations or through the use of particular genres (2, 3). Thus “veiled” and “ambiguous” genres such as chanting, weeping, or speaking in tongues, the performances of which often involve altered states of consciousness (157), are frequently, but not always, gender polarized (88, 89, 110, 136, 173, 254, 387). One characteristic does seem to apply cross-culturally: the low social evaluation of such genres on the part of either men or the entire group (153). Yet some scholars (e.g. 2, 3, 59, 153, 169, 171, 186, 347) have shown that women in many societies use, with varying degrees of success, socially devalued discourse as tools of resistance, protest, and defiance.

A reconciliation of these contradictory findings surfaces when they are placed in a semiotic perspective. Cross-culturally, most observable differences in the linguistic behavior of gender groups are indexical of personas, contexts, roles, and other social categories commonly associated with gender categories (107, 186, 299, 325, 327, 387). In most cultures, women and men habitually find themselves in different situations and identify with social categories that call for different affect displays, be it in terms of the intensity or the nature of these displays. Affect is thus an important mediating agent between language and gender, and, more broadly, between the individual and society. This perspective suggests that contexts, rather than just individuals, be framed as gendered categories. This perspective provides a better model for accounts of, for example, the different affective styles that the Pintupi of Australia adopt in the presence of certain combinations of kin (with gender figuring prominently in the definition of the situation; 316), and the affect-heavy verbal displays through which male customers affirm gendered dominance over cocktail waitresses in an American working-class bar (406).

LANGUAGE, AFFECT, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In stratified societies, social groups are frequently perceived as having different affective styles, and class identification rests in part on the individual's affective demeanor. Although little work has been done on either empirically observable patterns or extant ideologies across social groups and cultures, several patterns emerge in the ways social classes and linguistic affect are interrelated.

First, social groups may differ in the general intensity of their affect displays. High-ranking rural Wolof are expected to display an affectively flat *maîtresse de soi*, particularly in contexts where social standing is highlighted,

while low-ranking individuals engage in highly demonstrative displays of emotionality (230; cf also 7 on the Barundi). Suggestive of a similar state of affairs is the contrast between the sensationalistic, self-advertising, and “emotional” communicative style of American newspapers geared to the working classes and the more “rational” news discourse addressed to the upper echelons of society (376). The “neutralizing distance” characteristic of much middle-class (particularly public) discourse serves a double function. It indexes the middle-of-the-road approach that middle-class ideology values (60), and it excludes those who “let themselves be carried away” by their emotional impulses (61:88–89).

Second, social classes can also be associated with different types of affect. Sennett & Cobb (385) suggest that American working-class individuals, when talking about work, engage in discourse that downplays their own achievements, while middle-class ways of talking about such topics highlight the individual’s status as the source of success (see also 384 for a discussion of discourse and authority-structure maintenance). Some have hypothesized that anonymity, sharp public-private dichotomy, and relative lack of social control in Western middle-class life foster the use of impression-management strategies, which have become normalized in the eyes of their users (139).

Third, the affective meaning of particular features can vary according to who uses them. In an American industrial environment, the “powerful” have been shown to use the discourse marker *you know* to mark confidence in their own meaning, among other things; the “powerless,” in contrast, use it for its dialogic qualities (215, 220).

Critical inquiries into the relationships of language with class structure, class ideology, and political economy have recognized that language can function as a powerful tool in establishing and maintaining power asymmetries (132, 177, 178). Indeed, hegemony is control of both physical and symbolic production (378:314–50), which of course includes language. There is evidence that affect in language plays a pivotal role in social processes. An American prison official’s refusal to negotiate with rioting Black inmates until they “calm down” and are willing to “talk rationally”—i.e. adopt a middle-class White affective style (255)—is a telling illustration. Affective styles are also frequently used to manipulate asymmetries. When Wolof griots praise high-ranking individuals in highly affective oratorical deliveries, they move their audiences to admiration, and thus enhance the status of the targets of the praise, who then must display greater material generosity toward social inferiors (233). Among the Wolof again (228), and in Iran (37), Samoa (121), and probably many other societies, deferential and positively affective linguistic behaviors are utilized as power-manipulating devices. Affective elements in language can also serve, in the hands of the oppressed, as vehicles of protest against and resistance to oppressive institutions, dominant groups,

and their symbols (127, 377, 449). Thus emerge satirical genres, folksongs, and jokes targeting dominant groups, which allow the dominated to express their resentment of the status quo. The overwrought self-humbling deference Malaysian peasants show an unpopular landlord (378:25; cf also 11, 190) and the extravagantly theatrical story performances telling of exploits against the powerful in a Lebanese village (160) are striking examples of the exploitation of affective tools in symbolic resistance. The resulting constitutive relationship between hegemony and linguistic affect remains in large part virgin territory. In particular, little is known of the historical dimensions of this relationship (but see 5, 84, 383 for promising avenues). A historically informed approach, where possible, can be expected to help explain the nature of contemporary dynamics among affect, language, and social processes.

CONCLUSION

This review has investigated various avenues in the study of the affective dimensions of language. Just as emotionality is pivotal in the cultural construction of the relationship between self and culture, linguistic displays of emotionality serve important, if complex, semiotic functions in this process.

As represented in a system of indexical signs, affect permeates all levels of linguistic and communicative structures, all utterances, and all communicative contexts, but it does so in more or less transparent ways. As this review has shown, language users exploit differences among various affective keys in the relative overtiness of affect to define contexts, social structures, and their relationship to discourse. The overall effect, which was loosely termed the affective style of groups and contexts, demonstrates the importance of the constitutive linkage between language on the one hand and social categories and situations on the other. In particular, how affect is used and manipulated across contexts can also constitute emotional life. Thus equal attention must be paid to the *representation* and the *presentation* of emotion processes (36, 68, 383); talk (or writing) about emotions is a different activity from the interweaving of emotions and discourse, although the two are related in a complex manner.

Investigations of the role of affect in language cannot proceed without a fine-grained ethnographic inquiry into language use in context. Questions that must be addressed include: Who uses which affective tools, for what purpose, in what context, and what role does affect play in the linguistic representation of symbolic processes (e.g. emotion management)? A linguistic approach to affect thus needs to problematize context and contextualization (33, 167). In particular, since affect in language indexes culturally constructed categories of emotionality, these categories must become a parallel object of inquiry. Ideal contexts for the study of the relationship between language and emotion-

al life are situations in which emotions themselves become the focus of attention: Conflictual events (67, 179), conflict-resolution and therapeutic encounters (443, 446), and the ethnographic interview itself (72) can provide rich ethnographic opportunities for such investigations.

Affect, like other areas of language (152, 232), is deeply embedded in social, political, and economic contexts (4, 11). The indexical nature of affect in language makes it both an ideal vehicle for the affirmation of hegemonic structures and an ideal (often covert) tool in the resistance to these structures. Furthermore, what serves as a vehicle of affect in language frequently also has social meaning. Code switching in a multilingual community, for example, can index levity, anger, or caring, but it simultaneously indexes the boundaries and membership of social groups. As they pepper their conversations with proverbs, older Spanish speakers establish themselves along an age (and status) hierarchy and provide an affectively charged frame for their pronouncements (73). The interweaving of referential meaning, affect, and social categories does not necessarily presume that referential meaning is the pivotal category. The distinctive affective response of Wolof women from different social strata to a suicide scene (high-caste women impassive, low-caste women screaming) first indexes affect, and secondarily rank, through norms of conduct associated with social status (230). And, of course, social meaning can also function as a semiotic mediator between referentiality and affect. Such is the case of the socially stigmatized form *ain't*, which, when used by the British aristocracy, indexes a "studied indifference" to matters of class (321). Affect thus plays an important mediating role in the relationship of the individual to society, but this mediating role is not unidirectional.

How can a closer look at the role of affect in the everyday use of language inform ethnographic concerns? Anthropologists have long recognized that social groups have distinctive emotion-management styles. Ethnographic accounts of emotional life in various groups (e.g. 74, 250, 280, 316, 352) have defined emotions in the context of social action, characterized how particular emotions are evaluated from a normative perspective, and identified "hypercognized" and "hypocognized" (i.e. the focus of more or less cultural attention) emotional categories, to use Levy's (281) useful terminology (cf 54, 307). In their investigations of these questions, ethnographers rely heavily on observations of affect in everyday interactions which, without a sophisticated understanding of how affect is embedded in language, must rely on the more overt, explicit, normative, and best-articulated aspects of interaction (297). What is advocated here is that closer attention also be paid to the more covert ways affect suffuses language. For example, among groups that emphasize control of aggression displays (e.g. 74, 311), can more covert affect indexes, which easily escape normative scrutiny, be used to communicate such feelings as anger in everyday interactions? Which indexes are so used in

what contexts? How is the inherent indeterminacy of many affect-encoding devices exploited? Paying greater attention to such microanalytic concerns, and to the complex relationship between microscopic aspects of emotional behavior and insiders' emotional discourse, can yield a rich and complex ethnographic text.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I had the good fortune of discussing many of the issues presented here with Sue Philips and Charles Briggs, and of receiving detailed comments on earlier drafts from Harold Conklin, Micaela di Leonardo, Joseph Errington, Angélique Haugerud, and Harold Scheffler. Many of their insights appear in this discussion, but none of the shortcomings are theirs. I also thank the many colleagues who were kind enough to send me offprints, typescripts, and references.

Literature Cited

1. Abrahams, R. D. 1983. *The Man-of-Words in the West Indies: Performance and the Emergence of Creole Culture*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2. Abu-Lughod, L. 1985. Honor and the sentiments of loss in a Bedouin society. *Am. Ethnol.* 12:245–61
3. Abu-Lughod, L. 1986. *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
4. Abu-Lughod, L. 1990. Shifting politics in Bedouin love poetry. See Ref. 292, pp. 24–45
5. Abu-Lughod, L., Lutz, C. 1990. Introduction: emotion, discourse, and the politics of everyday life. See Ref. 292, pp. 1–23
6. Aijmer, K. 1983. Emotional adjectives in English. In *Papers From the Seventh Scandinavian Conference of Linguistics*, ed. F. Karlsson, 1:199–219. Helsinki: Dept. Gen. Linguist., Univ. Helsinki
7. Albert, E. M. 1972. Cultural patterning of speech behavior in Burundi. See Ref. 181, pp. 72–105
8. Algeo, J. 1988. The tag question in British English: It's different, isn't it? *English World-Wide* 9:171–91
9. Anttila, R. 1975. Affective vocabulary in Finnish: an(other) invitation. *Ural-Altaische Jahrb.* 47:10–19
10. Anttila, R., Samarin, W. 1970. Inventory and choice in expressive language. *Word* 26:153–69
11. Appadurai, A. 1990. Topographies of the self: praise and emotion in Hindu India. See Ref. 292, pp. 92–112
12. Apte, M. L. 1985. *Humor and Laughter: An Anthropological Approach*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
13. Arndt, H., Janney, R. W. 1987. *InterGrammar: Toward an Integrative Model of Verbal, Prosodic and Kinesic Choices in Speech*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter
14. Atkinson, J. M. 1984. Public speaking and audience responses: some techniques for inviting applause. See Ref. 16, pp. 370–409
15. Atkinson, J. M. 1985. Refusing invited applause: preliminary observations from a case study of charismatic oratory. See Ref. 436, 3:161–81
16. Atkinson, J. M., Heritage, J., eds. 1984. *Structure of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
17. Bailey, F. G. 1983. *The Tactical Uses of Passion: An Essay on Power, Reason and Reality*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
18. Bakhtin, M. M. 1981 [1935]. *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. M. Holquist; transl. C. Emerson, M. Holquist. Austin: Univ. Texas Press
19. Bally, C. 1952. *Le Langage et la Vie*. Genève: Droz. 3rd ed.
20. Basso, E. 1985. *A Musical View of the Universe: Kalapalo Myths and Ritual Performances*. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
21. Basso, E. 1986. Quoted dialogues in Kalapalo narrative discourse. See Ref. 388, pp. 119–68
22. Basso, E. 1989. Kalapalo biography: psychology and language in a South

- American oral history. *Am. Anthropol.* 91:551-69
23. Basso, K. H. 1972. "To give up on words": silence in Western Apache culture. In *Language and Social Context: Selected Readings*, ed. P. P. Giglioli, pp. 67-86. Harmondsworth: Penguin
 24. Basso, K. H. 1976. "Wise words of the Western Apache": metaphor and semantic theory. In *Meaning in Anthropology*, ed. K. H. Basso, H. A. Selby, pp. 93-123. Albuquerque: Univ. New Mexico Press
 25. Basso, K. H. 1979. *Portraits of the "Whiteman": Linguistic Play and Cultural Symbols Among the Western Apache*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 26. Basso, K. H. 1984. "Stalking with stories": names, places, and moral narratives among the Western Apache. In *Text, Play, and Story: The Construction and Reconstruction of Self and Society*, ed. E. M. Bruner, pp. 19-55. Washington, DC: Am. Ethnol. Soc.
 27. Basso, K. H. 1988. "Speaking with names": language and landscape among the Western Apache. *Cult. Anthropol.* 3:99-130
 28. Bateson, G. 1955. A theory of play and fantasy. Reprinted 1972 in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, pp. 177-93. New York: Ballantine
 29. Bateson, G. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. San Francisco: Chandler
 30. Baugh, J. 1983. *Black Street Speech*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press
 31. Bauman, R. 1983. *Let Your Words Be Few: Symbolism of Speaking and Silence Among Seventeenth-Century Quakers*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 32. Bauman, R. 1986. *Story, Performance, and Event: Contextual Studies of Oral Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 33. Bauman, R., Briggs, C. L. 1990. Poetics and performance as critical perspectives on language and social life. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 19:59-88
 34. Bauman, R., Sherzer, J., eds. 1974. *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 35. Bearth, T. 1980. Is there a universal correlation between pitch and information value? In *Wege zur Universalienforschung: Sprachwissenschaftliche Beiträge zum 60. Geburtstag von Hansjakob Seiler*, ed. G. Bretschneider, C. Lehmann, pp. 124-30. Tübingen: Gunter Narr
 36. Bedford, E. 1986. Emotions and statements about them. See Ref. 187, pp. 15-31
 37. Beeman, W. O. 1988. Affectivity in Persian language use. *Cult., Med. Psychiatry* 12:9-30
 38. Bernard-Thierry, S. 1960. Les onomatopées en malgache. *Bull. Soc. Linguist. Paris* 55:240-69
 39. Besnier, N. 1986. Word order in Tuvaluan. In *FOCAL I: Papers from the Fourth International Conference on Austronesian Linguistics*, ed. P. Geraghty, L. Carrington, S. A. Wurm, pp. 245-68. Canberra: Pacific Linguist.
 40. Besnier, N. 1986. Register as a sociolinguistic unit: defining formality. *South. Calif. Occ. Pap. Linguist.* 11:25-63
 41. Besnier, N. 1988. Semantic and pragmatic constraints on Tuvaluan raising. *Linguistics* 26:747-78
 42. Besnier, N. 1988. The linguistic relationships of spoken and written Nukulaelae registers. *Language* 64:707-36
 43. Besnier, N. 1989. Literacy and feelings: the encoding of affect in Nukulaelae letters. *Text* 9:69-92
 44. Besnier, N. 1989. Information withholding as a manipulative and collusive strategy in Nukulaelae gossip. *Lang. Soc.* 18:315-41
 45. Besnier, N. 1990. Conflict management, gossip, and affective meaning on Nukulaelae. See Ref. 443, pp. 290-334
 46. Biber, D. 1988. *Variation Across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 47. Biber, D., Finegan, E. 1989. Styles of stance in English: lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. *Text* 9:93-124
 48. Birch, D., O'Toole, M., eds. 1988. *Functions of Style*. London: Pinter
 49. Blakar, R. M. 1979. Language as a means of social power: theoretical-empirical explorations of language and language use as embedded in a social matrix. In *Pragmalinguistics: Theory and Practice*, ed. J. L. Mey, pp. 131-69. The Hague: Mouton
 50. Bloch, M., ed. 1975. *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Societies*. New York: Academic
 51. Blom, J. P., Gumperz, J. J. 1972. Social meaning in linguistic structures. See Ref. 181, pp. 407-34
 52. Bock, P. K. 1976. "I think but dare not speak": silence in Elizabethan culture. *J. Anthropol. Res.* 32:285-94
 53. Bock, P. K. 1984. *Shakespeare and Elizabethan Culture: An Anthropological View*. New York: Shoken
 54. Bock, P. K. 1988. *Rethinking Psychological Anthropology: Continuity and Change in the Study of Human Action*. New York: W. H. Freeman. 2nd ed.

55. Bolinger, D. 1978. Intonation across languages. See Ref. 174, 2:471-524
56. Bolinger, D. 1984. Surprise. In *Language and Cognition: Essays in Honor of Arthur J. Bronstein*, ed. L. J. Raphael, C. B. Raphael, M. R. Valdovinos, pp. 45-58. New York: Plenum
57. Bolinger, D. 1986. *Intonation and Its Parts: Melody in Spoken English*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press
58. Bolinger, D. 1989. *Intonation and Its Uses: Melody in Grammar and Discourse*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press
59. Borker, R. 1980. Anthropology: social and cultural perspectives. See Ref. 300, pp. 26-44
60. Bourdieu, P. 1979. *La Distinction: Critique Sociale du Jugement*. Paris: Editions de Minuit
61. Bourdieu, P. 1982. *Ce Que Parler Veut Dire: L'économie des Echanges Linguistiques*. Paris: Fayard
62. Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Homo Academicus*. Paris: Editions de Minuit
63. Braun, F. 1988. *Terms of Address: Problems of Patterns and Usage in Various Language and Cultures*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter
64. Braun, F., Kohz, A., Schubert, K. 1986. *Anredeforschung: Kommentierte Bibliographie zur Soziolinguistik der Anrede*. Tübingen: Narr
65. Brenneis, D. L. 1984. Grog and gossip in Bhatgaon: style and substance in Fiji Indian conversation. *Am. Ethnol.* 11: 487-506
66. Brenneis, D. L. 1987. Dramatic gestures: the Fiji Indian *pancayat* as therapeutic discourse. *Pap. Pragmat.* 1(1):55-78
67. Brenneis, D. L. 1988. Language and disputing. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 17: 221-37
68. Brenneis, D. L. 1990. Shared and solitary sentiments: the discourse of friendship, play and anger in Bhatgaon. See Ref. 292, pp. 113-25
69. Brenneis, D. L., Lein, L. 1977. "You fruithead:" a sociolinguistic approach to children's disputes. In *Child Discourse*, ed. S. Ervin-Tripp, C. Mitchell-Kernan, pp. 49-65. New York: Academic
70. Brenneis, D. L., Myers, F. R., eds. 1984. *Dangerous Words: Language and Politics in the Pacific*. New York: New York Univ. Press
71. Briggs, C. L. 1985. The pragmatics of proverb performance in New Mexican Spanish. *Am. Anthropol.* 87:793-810
72. Briggs, C. L. 1986. *Learning How to Ask: A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role of the Interview in Social Science Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
73. Briggs, C. L. 1988. *Competence in Performance: The Creativity of Tradition in Mexican Verbal Art*. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
74. Briggs, J. L. 1970. *Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press
75. Brodkey, L. 1987. *Academic Writing as Social Practice*. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press
76. Brown, P. 1979. *Language, interaction, and sex roles in a Mayan community: a study in politeness and the position of women*. PhD thesis. Univ. Calif., Berkeley
77. Brown, P. 1980. How and why are women more polite: some evidence from a Mayan community. See Ref. 300, pp. 111-36
78. Brown, P., Levinson, S. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
79. Brown, R. W., Gilman, A. 1960. The pronouns of power and solidarity. See Ref. 381, pp. 253-76
80. Brudner, L. A. 1977. Language creativity and the psychotherapy relationship. In *Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Change*, ed. B. G. Blount, M. Sanches, pp. 271-87. New York: Academic
81. Bühler, K. 1934. *Sprachtheorie*. Jena: Fischer
82. Burke, K. 1945. *A Grammar of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall
83. Burke, K. 1950. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall
84. Burke, P., Porter, R., eds. 1987. *The Social History of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
85. Cacioppo, J. T., Tassinari, L. G. 1989. The concept of attitudes: a psychophysiological analysis. See Ref. 442, pp. 309-46
86. Cameron, D. 1985. *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*. London: Macmillan
87. Cameron, D., McAlinden, F., O'Leary, K. 1989. Lakoff in context: the social and linguistic functions of tag questions. In *Women in their Speech Communities: New Perspectives on Language and Sex*, ed. J. Coates, D. Cameron, pp. 74-93. London: Longman
88. Caraveli-Chaves, A. 1980. Bridge between worlds: the Greek women's lament as communicative event. *J. Am. Folklore* 93:129-57
89. Caraveli-Chaves, A. 1982. The song beyond the song: aesthetics and social interaction in Greek folksong. *J. Am. Folklore* 95:129-58

90. Carbaugh, D. 1988. *Talking American: Cultural Discourse on Donahue*. Norwood: Ablex
91. Caton, S. C. 1987. Contributions of Roman Jakobson. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 16:223-60
92. Caton, S. C. 1990. "*Peaks of Yemen I Summon:*" *Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
93. Chafe, W. L. 1970. *Meaning and the Structure of Language*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
94. Chafe, W. L. 1982. Integration and involvement in speaking, writing, and oral literature. See Ref. 412, pp. 35-54
95. Chafe, W. L. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. See Ref. 97, pp. 261-73
96. Chafe, W. L., Danielewicz, J. 1987. Properties of spoken and written language. In *Comprehending Oral and Written Language*, ed. R. Horowitz, S. J. Samuels, pp. 83-113. New York: Academic
97. Chafe, W. L., Nichols, J., eds. 1986. *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology*. Norwood: Ablex
98. Chafe, W. L., Tannen, D. 1987. The relation between written and spoken language. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 16:383-407
99. Chodorow, N. 1974. Family structure and feminine personality. See Ref. 354, pp. 43-66
100. Chodorow, N. 1978. *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
101. Cicourel, A. 1985. Text and discourse. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 14:159-85
102. Clancy, P. M. 1985. The acquisition of communicative style in Japanese. See Ref. 373, 1:213-50
103. Clancy, P. M. 1986. The acquisition of Japanese. See Ref. 401, pp. 373-524
104. Coates, J. 1986. *Women, Men and Language: A Sociolinguistic Account of Sex Differences in Language*. London: Longman
105. Conklin, H. C. 1980. *Folk Classification: A Topically Arranged Bibliography of Contemporary and Background References Through 1971*. New Haven: Dept. Anthropol., Yale Univ. Rev. ed.
106. Cook, H. M. 1987. Social meanings of the Japanese sentence-final particle *no*. *Pap. Pragmat.* 1(2):123-68
107. Cook, H. M. 1988. *Sentential particles in Japanese conversation: a study of indexicality*. PhD thesis. Univ. South. Calif.
108. Courtenay, K. 1976. Ideophones defined as a phonological class: the case of Yoruba. *Stud. Afr. Linguist.* 6 (Suppl.):13-26
109. Cunningham, A., Tickner, D. 1981. Psychoanalysis and indigenous psychology. See Ref. 199, pp. 225-45
110. Danforth, L. M. 1982. *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press
111. Davis, K. 1984. *Problem (Re)formulation in Psychotherapy*. Rotterdam: Inst. Prevent. Soc. Psychiatry, Erasmus Univ.
112. Davitz, J. R. 1969. *The Language of Emotion*. New York: Academic
113. Diffloth, G. 1972. Notes on expressive meaning. *Chicago Linguist. Soc.* 8:440-47
114. di Leonardo, M. 1984. *The Varieties of Ethnic Experience: Kinship, Class, and Gender Among Italian-Americans*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
115. Dillon, G. L. 1981. *Constructing Texts: Elements of a Theory of Composition and Style*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
116. Dore, J., McDermott, R. P. 1982. Linguistic indeterminacy and social context in utterance interpretation. *Language* 58:374-98
117. Du Bois, J. W. 1987. Meaning without intention: lessons from divination. *Pap. Pragmat.* 1(2):80-122
118. Dundes, A., Leach, J. W., Özkök, B. 1972. The strategy of Turkish boys' verbal dueling rhymes. See Ref. 181, pp. 130-60
119. Duranti, A. 1984. The social meaning of subject pronouns in Italian conversation. *Text* 4:277-311
120. Duranti, A. 1986. The audience as co-author: an introduction. *Text* 6:239-47
121. Duranti, A. 1986. *Language in context and language as context: the Samoan respect vocabulary*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Anthropol. Assoc., 85th
122. Duranti, A. 1988. Intentions, language, and social action in a Samoan context. *J. Pragmat.* 12:13-33
123. Duranti, A. 1988. *Politics and grammar: the constitution of agency in Samoan political discourse*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Anthropol. Assoc., 87th, Phoenix
124. Duranti, A., Ochs, E. 1979. Left-dislocation in Italian conversation. In *Syntax and Semantics*, ed. T. Givón, 12:377-416. New York: Academic
125. Eckman, P. 1984. Expression and the nature of emotion. In *Approaches to Emotion*, ed. K. R. Scherer, P. Eckman, pp. 319-44. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum

126. Eckman, P. 1989. The argument and evidence about universals in facial expressions of emotions. See Ref. 442, pp. 143–64
127. Edmondson, R. 1983. *Rhetoric in Sociology*. London: Macmillan
128. Erickson, F., Shultz, J. 1982. *The Counselor as Gatekeeper: Social Interaction in Interviews*. New York: Academic
129. Errington, J. J. 1985. On the nature of the sociolinguistic sign: describing the Javanese speech levels. See Ref. 306, pp. 287–310
130. Errington, J. J. 1988. *Structure and Style in Javanese: A Semiotic View of Linguistic Etiquette*. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
131. Ervin-Tripp, S. M. 1972. On sociolinguistic rules: alternation and co-occurrence. See Ref. 181, pp. 213–50
132. Fairclough, N. 1988. Register, power and sociosemantic change. See Ref. 48, pp. 111–25
133. Faris, J. 1966. The dynamics of verbal exchange: a Newfoundland example. *Anthropologica* 8:235–48
134. Faris, J. 1968. The lexicon of 'occasions' in Cat Harbour: some comments on the cultural validation of ethnographic descriptions. *Man* (N.S.) 3:112–24
135. Farkas, D. F. 1988. On obligatory control. *Linguist. Philos.* 11:27–58
136. Feld, S. 1982. *Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression*. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
137. Firth, J. R. 1950. Personality and language in society. *Sociol. Rev.* 42:7–52
138. Firth, J. R. 1957. *Papers in Linguistics 1934–1951*. London: Oxford Univ. Press
139. Foley, D. E. 1989. Does the working class have a culture in the anthropological sense? *Cult. Anthropol.* 4:137–62
140. Foley, W. A., Van Valin, R. D. 1985. Information packaging in the clause. See Ref. 389, 1:282–364
141. Fortune, G. F. 1962. *Ideophones in Shona*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press
142. Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon
143. Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G., Trew, T. 1979. *Language and Control*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
144. Fowler, R., Kress, G. 1979. Critical linguistics. See Ref. 143, pp. 185–213
145. Frank, J. 1989. On conversational involvement by mail: the use of questions in direct sales letters. *Text* 9:231–59
146. Friedrich, P. 1972. Social context and semantic feature: the Russian pronominal usage. See Ref. 181, pp. 270–300
147. Friedrich, P. 1986. *The Language Parallax: Linguistic Relativism and Poetic Indeterminacy*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press
148. Friedrich, P. 1989. Language, ideology, and political economy. *Am. Anthropol.* 91:295–312
149. Friedrich, P., Redfield, J. 1978. Speech as a personality marker: the case of Achilles. *Language* 54:263–88
150. Fudge, E. 1970. Phonological structure and 'expressiveness'. *J. Linguist.* 6: 161–88
151. Gal, S. 1979. *Language Shift: Social Determinants of Linguistic Change in Bilingual Austria*. New York: Academic
152. Gal, S. 1989. Language and political economy. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 18: 345–67
153. Gal, S. 1991. Between speech and silence: the problematics of research on language and gender. In *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era*, ed. M. di Leonardo. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press. In press
154. Garrochio, D. 1987. Verbal insults in eighteenth-century Paris. See Ref. 84, pp. 104–19
155. Garvin, P. L., ed. 1955. *A Prague School Reader in Aesthetics, Literary Structure, and Style*. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press
156. Geis, M. L. 1982. *The Language of Television Advertising*. New York: Academic
157. George, K. 1986. *Gender and ritual language: a case from Upland Sulawesi*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Folklore Soc., Baltimore
158. Gerber, E. R. 1985. Rage and obligation: Samoan emotion in conflict. See Ref. 447, pp. 121–67
159. Gilbert, G. N., Mulkay, M. 1984. *Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
160. Gilsenan, M. 1989. Word of honour. See Ref. 176, pp. 193–221
161. Gnerre, M. 1986. The decline of dialogue: ceremonial and mythological discourse among the Shuar and Achuar. See Ref. 388, pp. 307–341
162. Goddard, C. 1979. Particles and illocutionary semantics. *Pap. Linguist.* 12: 185–230
163. Goffman, E. 1975. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York: Harper & Row

164. Goffman, E. 1978. Response cries. *Language* 54:787-81
165. Goffman, E. 1979. Footing. *Semiotica* 25:1-29
166. Goodwin, C. 1984. Notes on story structure and the organization of participation. See Ref. 16, pp. 225-46
167. Goodwin, C., Duranti, A. 1990. Rethinking context: an introduction. In *Rethinking Context*, ed. C. Goodwin, A. Duranti. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
168. Goodwin, C., Goodwin, M. H. 1987. Concurrent operations on talk: notes on the interactive organization of assessments. *Pap. Pragmat.* 1(1):1-54
169. Goodwin, M. H. 1980. He-said-she-said: formal cultural procedures for the construction of a gossip dispute. *Am. Ethnol.* 7:674-95
170. Goodwin, M. H. 1985. *Byplay: the framing of collaborative collusion*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Anthropol. Assoc., 84th, Washington, DC
171. Goodwin, M. H. 1990. *He-Said-She-Said: Talk as Social Organization in a Black Peer Group*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
172. Grace, G. W. 1987. *The Linguistic Construction of Reality*. London: Croom Helm
173. Graham, L. 1986. Three modes of Shavante vocal expression: wailing, collective singing, and political oratory. See Ref. 388, pp. 83-118
174. Greenberg, J. H., ed. 1978. *Universals of Human Language*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press. 4 Vols.
175. Grice, H. P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In *Syntax and Semantics*, ed. P. Cole, J. Morgan, 3:41-58. New York: Academic
176. Grillo, R., ed. 1989. *Social Anthropology and the Politics of Language*. London: Routledge
177. Grillo, R. 1989. Anthropology, language, politics. See Ref. 176, pp. 1-24
178. Grillo, R. G., Pratt, J., Street, B. V. 1987. Anthropology, linguistics and language. In *New Horizons in Linguistics. 2: An Introduction to Contemporary Linguistic Research*, ed. J. Lyons, R. Coates, M. Deuchar, G. Gazdar, pp. 269-95. Harmondsworth: Penguin
179. Grimshaw, A. D., ed. 1990. *Conflict Talk: Sociolinguistic Investigations of Arguments in Conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
180. Gumperz, J. J. 1982. *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
181. Gumperz, J. J., Hymes, D., eds. 1972. *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston
182. Halliday, M. A. K. 1970. Language structure and language function. In *New Horizons in Linguistics. 1: An Introduction*, ed. J. Lyons, pp. 140-65. Harmondsworth: Penguin
183. Halliday, M. A. K. 1973. *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. London: Edward Arnold
184. Halliday, M. A. K., Hasan, R. 1976. *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman
185. Hanks, W. F. 1989. Text and textuality. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 18:95-127
186. Harding, S. 1975. Women and words in a Spanish village. In *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, ed. R. Reiter, pp. 283-308. New York: Monthly Review Press
187. Harré, R., ed. 1986. *The Social Construction of Emotions*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
188. Harris, R. 1980. *The Language Makers*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
189. Haviland, J. B. 1987. Fighting words: evidential particles, affect and argument. *Berkeley Linguist. Soc.* 13:343-54
190. Haviland, J. B. 1988. *Deprecatives*. Presented at Conf. on Honorifics, Portland
191. Haviland, J. B. 1989. 'Sure, sure': evidence and affect. *Text* 9:27-68
192. Haviland, J. B. 1989. "That was the last time I seen them, and no more": voices through time in Australian Aboriginal autobiography. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Ethnol. Assoc., Santa Fe
193. Head, B. F. 1978. Respect degrees in pronominal reference. See Ref. 174, 3:151-211
194. Heath, C. 1988. Embarrassment and interactional organization. In *Erving Goffman: Exploring the Interaction Order*, ed. P. Drew, A. Wootton, pp. 136-60. Cambridge: Polity Press
195. Heath, S. B. 1983. *Ways with Words: Language, Life, and Work in Communities and Classrooms*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
196. Heelas, P. 1983. Indigenous representations of the emotions: the Chewong. *J. Anthropol. Soc. Oxford* 14:87-103
197. Heelas, P. 1984. Emotions across cultures: objectivity and cultural divergence. In *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*, ed. S. Brown, pp. 21-42. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
198. Heelas, P. 1986. Emotion talk across cultures. See Ref. 187, pp. 234-66
199. Heelas, P., Lock, A., eds. 1981. *Indigenous Psychologies*. London: Academic

200. Heller, M., ed. 1988. *Code-Switching: Anthropological and Sociolinguistic Perspectives*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
201. Henry, J. 1936. The linguistic expression of emotions. *Am. Anthropol.* 38:250-56
202. Henton, C. G. 1989. Fact and fiction in the description of female and male pitch. *Lang. Commun.* 9:299-311
203. Heritage, J. C., Greatbatch, D. 1986. Generating applause: a study of rhetoric and response at party political conferences. *Am. J. Sociol.* 92:110-57
204. Heritage, J. C., Clayman, S., Zimmerman, D. H. 1988. Discourse and message analysis: the micro-structure of mass media messages. In *Advancing Communication Science: Merging Mass and Interpersonal Processes*, ed. R. P. Hawkins, J. M. Wiemann, S. Pingree, pp. 77-109. Newbury Park: Sage
205. Herzfeld, M. 1985. *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press
206. Hess, U., Kappas, A., Scherer, K. R. 1988. Multichannel communication of emotion: synthetic signal production. In *Facets of Emotion: Recent Research*, ed. K. R. Scherer, pp. 161-82. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum
207. Hill, J. H. 1985. The grammar of consciousness and the consciousness of grammar. *Am. Ethnol.* 12:725-37
208. Hill, J. H. 1988. Language, culture, and world view. See Ref. 320, 4:14-36
209. Hill, J. H. 1989. Weeping as a meta-message in a Mexicano woman's narrative. Unpublished
210. Hill, J. H. 1990. The voices of Don Gabriel: responsibility and self in a modern Mexicano narrative. In *Dialogic Anthropology*, ed. B. Mannheim, D. Tedlock. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
211. Hochschild, A. R. 1983. *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
212. Hockett, C. F. 1987. *Refurbishing Our Foundations: Elementary Linguistics From an Advanced Point of View*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
213. Holland, D., Quinn, N., eds. 1987. *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
214. Holmes, J. 1984. Hedging your bets and sitting on the fence: some evidence for hedging as support structures. *Te Reo* 27:47-62
215. Holmes, J. 1986. Functions of *you know* in women's and men's speech. *Lang. Soc.* 15:1-22
216. Holquist, M. 1983. The politics of representation. *Q. Newsl. Lab. Compar. Hum. Cogn.* 5:2-9
217. Hopper, P., Thompson, S. A. 1980. Transitivity in grammar and discourse. *Language* 56:251-300
218. Horn, L. R. 1989. *A Natural History of Negation*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
219. Howard, I., Niyekawa-Howard, A. 1976. Passivization. In *Syntax and Semantics*, ed. M. Shibatani, 5:201-37. New York: Academic
220. Huspek, M. 1989. Linguistic variability and power: an analysis of *you know/I think* variation in working-class speech. *J. Pragmat.* 13:661-83
221. Hymes, D. 1962. The ethnography of speaking. In *Anthropology and Human Behavior*, ed. T. Gladwin, W. Sturtevant, pp. 15-53. Washington: Anthropol. Soc. Wash.
222. Hymes, D. 1972. Models of the interaction of language and social life. See Ref. 181, pp. 35-71
223. Hymes, D. 1974. *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach*. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
224. Hymes, D. 1974. Ways of speaking. See Ref. 34, pp. 433-51
225. Hymes, D. 1979. How to talk like a bear in Takelma. *Int. J. Am. Linguist.* 45:101-6
226. Hymes, D. 1981. *"In Vain I Tried to Tell You": Essays in Native American Ethnopoetics*. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
227. Illich, I. 1982. *Gender*. New York: Pantheon
228. Irvine, J. T. 1974. Strategies of status manipulation in the Wolof greeting. See Ref. 34, pp. 167-91
229. Irvine, J. T. 1979. Formality and informality in communicative events. *Am. Anthropol.* 81:773-90
230. Irvine, J. T. 1982. Language and affect: some cross-cultural issues. In *Georgetown University Roundtable on Languages and Linguistics*, ed. H. Byrnes, pp. 31-47. Washington: Georgetown Univ. Press
231. Irvine, J. T. 1985. Status and style in language. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 14: 557-81
232. Irvine, J. T. 1989. When talk isn't cheap: language and political economy. *Am. Ethnol.* 16:248-67
233. Irvine, J. T. 1990. Registering affect: heteroglossia in the linguistic expression of emotion. See Ref. 292, pp. 126-61
234. Jakobson, R. 1957. *Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Russian Lang. Proj.
235. Jakobson, R. 1960. Concluding state-

- ment: linguistics and poetics. See Ref. 381, pp. 350–77
236. Jakobson, R. 1966. Grammatical parallelism and its Russian facet. *Language* 42:399–429
 237. James, D. 1972. Some aspects of the syntax and semantics of interjections. *Chicago Linguist. Soc.* 8:162–72
 238. Jefferson, G. 1984. On stepwise transition from talk about a trouble to inappropriately next-positioned matters. See Ref. 16, pp. 346–69
 239. Jefferson, G. 1984. On the organization of laughter in talk about troubles. See Ref. 14, pp. 346–69
 240. Jefferson, G. 1985. An exercise in the transcription and analysis of laughter. See Ref. 436, 3:25–34
 241. Jefferson, G., Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. 1987. Notes on laughter in the pursuit of intimacy. In *Talk and Social Organization*, ed. G. Button, J. R. E. Lee, pp. 152–205. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters
 242. Jespersen, O. 1923. *Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin*. New York: Henry Holt
 243. Johnson, F. 1985. The Western concept of self. In *Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives*, ed. A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos, F. L. K. Hsu, pp. 91–138. New York: Tavistock
 244. Jones, D. 1980. Gossip: notes on women's oral culture. In *The Voices and Words of Women and Men*, ed. C. Kramarae, pp. 193–98. Oxford: Pergamon
 245. Jordanova, L. J. 1980. Natural facts: a historical perspective on science and sexuality. In *Nature, Culture, and Gender*, ed. C. MacCormack, M. Strathern, pp. 42–69. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 246. Kagan, J. 1978. On emotion and its development: a working paper. In *The Development of Affect*, ed. M. Lewis, L. Rosenblum, pp. 11–42. New York: Plenum
 247. Kay, P. 1987. Linguistic competence and folk theories of language: two English hedges. See Ref. 213, pp. 67–77
 248. Keenan, E. O. 1974. Norms-makers, norm-breakers: uses of speech by men and women in a Malagasy community. See Ref. 34, pp. 125–43
 249. Keesing, R. M. 1989. Exotic readings of cultural texts. *Curr. Anthropol.* 30:459–79
 250. Kirkpatrick, J. T. 1983. *The Marquesan Notion of the Person*. Ann Arbor: UMI Press
 251. Kirkpatrick, J. T. 1985. Some Marquesan understanding of action and identity. See Ref. 447, pp. 80–120
 252. Kirkpatrick, J. T. 1985. How personal differences can make the person. In *The Social Construction of the Person*, ed. K. J. Gergen, K. E. Davis, pp. 225–40. New York: Springer-Verlag
 253. Kiesler, S., Zubrow, D., Moses, A. M., Geller, V. 1985. Affect in computer-mediated communication: an experiment in synchronous terminal-to-terminal discussion. *Hum. Comput. Interact.* 1:77–104
 254. Klymasz, R. 1975. Speaking at/about/with the dead: funerary rhetoric among Ukrainians in western Canada. *Can. Ethn. Stud.* 7:50–56
 255. Kochman, T. 1981. *Black and White Styles in Conflict*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
 256. Kövecses, Z. 1986. *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
 257. Kövecses, Z. 1988. *The Language of Love: The Semantics of Passion in Conversational English*. Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ. Press
 258. Kress, G. 1988. Textual matters: the social effectiveness of style. See Ref. 48, pp. 126–41
 259. Kress, G., Hodge, R. 1979. *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
 260. Kunene, D. P. 1965. The ideophone in Southern Sotho. *J. Afr. Linguist.* 4:19–39
 261. Kuno, S. 1976. Subject, theme, and the speaker's empathy: a reexamination of relativization phenomena. In *Subject and Topic*, ed. C. N. Li, pp. 417–44. New York: Academic
 262. Kuno, S. 1987. *Functional Syntax: Anaphora, Discourse, and Empathy*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
 263. Labov, W. 1972. Rules for ritual insults. In *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular*, pp. 297–353. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
 264. Labov, W. 1984. Intensity. In *Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications*, ed. D. Schiffrin, pp. 43–70. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press
 265. Labov, W., Fanshel, D. 1977. *Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation*. Orlando: Academic
 266. Ladd, D. R. Jr. 1980. *The Structure of Intonational Meaning: Evidence from English*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
 267. Lakoff, G. 1972. Hedges: a study of meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. *Chicago Linguist. Soc.* 8:183–228

268. Lakoff, G. 1987. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
269. Lakoff, G., Johnson, M. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
270. Lakoff, G., Kövecses, Z. 1987. The cognitive model of anger inherent in American English. See Ref. 213, pp. 195–221
271. Lakoff, R. 1975. *Language and Woman's Place*. New York: Harper & Row
272. Landar, H. 1979. Permitted sequences with Toba Batak heart. *Anthropol. Linguist.* 21:401–18
273. Langdon, M. 1978. Animal talk in Cocopa. *Int. J. Am. Linguist.* 44:10–16
274. Lavandera, B. R. 1986. Textual analysis of a conditional utterance. *Linguist. Ber.* 102:155–70
275. Leech, G. N. 1983. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman
276. Leff, J. 1977. The cross-cultural study of emotions. *Cult., Med. Psychiatry* 1:317–50
277. Lehrer, A. 1983. *Wine and Conversation*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
278. Léon, P. 1976. De l'analyse psychologique à la catégorisation auditive et acoustique des émotions dans la parole. *J. Psychologie* 4:305–24
279. Levine, L. 1977. *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought From Slavery to Freedom*. New York: Vintage
280. Levy, R. I. 1973. *Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Islands*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
281. Levy, R. I. 1984. Emotion, knowing, and culture. See Ref. 393, pp. 214–37
282. Lienhardt, G. 1980. Self, public and private: some African representations. *J. Anthropol. Soc. Oxford* 11:69–82
283. Linde, C. 1989. *Narrative as a resource for the social construction of self*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Anthropol. Assoc., Washington, DC
284. Linell, P. 1985. Language and the communication of emotion. In *Papers on Language and Communication Presented to Alvar Ellegård and Erik Fryman*, ed. S. Bäckman, G. Kjellmer, pp. 264–73. Göteborg: Acta Univ. Gothoburgensis
285. Linell, P. 1988. The impact of literacy on the conception of language: the case of linguistics. See Ref. 359, pp. 41–58
286. Lutz, C. 1982. The domain of emotion words on Ifaluk. *Am. Ethnol.* 9:113–28
287. Lutz, C. 1985. Ethnopsychology compared to what? Explaining behavior and consciousness among the Ifaluk. See Ref. 447, pp. 35–79
288. Lutz, C. 1987. Goals, events, and understanding in Ifaluk emotion theory. See Ref. 213, pp. 290–312
289. Lutz, C. 1987. Emotion, thought, and estrangement: emotion as a cultural category. *Cult. Anthropol.* 1:287–309
290. Lutz, C. 1988. *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
291. Lutz, C. 1990. Engendered emotion: gender, power, and the rhetoric of emotional control in American discourse. See Ref. 292, pp. 69–91
292. Lutz, C., Abu-Lughod, L., eds. 1990. *Language and the Politics of Emotion*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
293. Lutz, C., White, G. M. 1986. The anthropology of emotions. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 15:405–36
294. Lyons, J. 1977. *Semantics*, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
295. Macaulay, R. K. S. 1987. Polyphonic monologues: quoted direct speech in oral narratives. *Pap. Pragmat.* 1(2):1–34
296. Malinowski, B. 1923. The problem of meaning in primitive language. In *The Meaning of Meaning*, ed. C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, pp. 296–336. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
297. Marcus, G., Fisher, M. M. J. 1986. *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
298. Matisoff, J. 1979. *Blessings, Curses, Hopes, and Fears: Psycho-Ostensive Expressions in Yiddish*. Philadelphia: Inst. Stud. Hum. Iss.
299. McConnell-Ginet, S. 1988. Language and gender. See Ref. 320, 4:75–99
300. McConnell-Ginet, S., Borker, R., Furman, N. 1980. *Women and Language in Literature and Society*. New York: Praeger
301. McDermott, R. P. 1988. Inarticulate-ness. See Ref. 414, pp. 37–68
302. McDermott, R. P., Tylbor, H. 1983. On the necessity of collusion in conversation. *Text* 3:277–97
303. McGinnis, M. 1986. Preachin': a Black speech event. *South. Calif. Occ. Pap. Linguist.* 11:99–123
304. Menn, L., Boyce, S. 1982. Fundamental frequency and discourse structure. *Lang. Speech* 25:341–83
305. Merry, S. E. 1990. The discourses of mediation and the power of naming. *Yale J. Law Human.* 2:1–36
306. Mertz, E., Parmentier, R. J., eds. 1985. *Semiotic Mediation: Sociocultural and*

- Psychological Perspectives*. New York: Academic
307. Middleton, D. R. 1989. Emotional style: the cultural ordering of emotions. *Ethos* 17:187–201
 308. Mitchell-Kernan, C. 1972. Signifying and marking: two Afro-American speech acts. See Ref. 181, pp. 161–79
 309. Mitchell-Kernan, C., Kernan, K. T. 1975. Children's insults: America and Samoa. In *Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Use*, ed. M. Sanches, B. G. Blount, pp. 307–30. New York: Academic
 310. Mithun, M. 1982. The synchronic and diachronic behavior of plops, squeaks, croaks, signs, and moans. *Int. J. Am. Linguist.* 48:49–58
 311. Montagu, A., ed. 1978. *Learning Non-Aggression: The Experience of Non-Literate Societies*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press
 312. Mosbach, H., Tyler, W. J. 1986. A Japanese emotion: *amae*. See Ref. 187, pp. 289–307
 313. Mulkey, M. 1979. *Science and the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Allen
 314. Mulkey, M. 1984. Agreement and disagreement in conversations and letters. *Text* 5:201–27
 315. Mulkey, M. 1988. *On Humour: Its Nature and Place in Modern Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press
 316. Myers, F. R. 1986. *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics Among Western Desert Aborigines*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Inst. Press
 317. Nachman, S. R. 1982. Anti-humor: why the grand sorcerer wags his penis. *Ethos* 10:117–35
 318. Nash, R., Mulac, A. 1980. The intonation of verifiability. In *The Melody of Language*, ed. L. Waugh, C. H. van Schooneveld, pp. 219–41. Baltimore: University Park Press
 319. Newman, S. 1944. *Yokuts Language of California*. New York: Viking Fund
 320. Newmeyer, F. J., ed. 1988. *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey*, Vols. 1–4. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 321. Nunberg, G. 1980. The speech of the New York City upper class. In *Standards and Dialects in English*, ed. T. Shopen, J. M. Williams, pp. 150–73. Cambridge: Winthrop
 322. O'Barr, W., Atkins, B. 1980. 'Women's language' or 'powerless language'? See Ref. 300, pp. 93–110
 323. Ochs, E. 1985. Variation and error: a sociolinguistic study of language acquisition in Samoa. See Ref. 401, 1:783–838
 324. Ochs, E. 1986. From feelings to grammar: a Samoan case study. See Ref. 373, pp. 251–72
 325. Ochs, E. 1987. The impact of stratification and socialization on men's and women's speech. See Ref. 341, pp. 50–70
 326. Ochs, E. 1988. *Culture and Language Development: Language Acquisition and Language Socialization in a Samoan Village*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
 327. Ochs, E. 1990. Indexing gender. In *Gender Hierarchies*, ed. Peggy Miller. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
 328. Ochs, E., Schieffelin, B. B. 1984. Language acquisition and socialization: three developmental stories and their implications. See Ref. 393, pp. 276–320
 329. Ochs, E., Schieffelin, B. B. 1989. Language has a heart. *Text* 9:7–25
 330. Ong, W. J. 1981. *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness*. Amherst, MA: Univ. Mass. Press
 331. Ortner, S. B. 1974. Is female to male as nature is to culture? See Ref. 354, pp. 67–96
 332. Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., Miron, M. S. 1975. *Cross-cultural Universals of Affective Meaning*. Urbana: Univ. Ill. Press
 333. Östman, J. 1981. *You Know: A Discourse-Functional Approach*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
 334. Outram, D. 1987. *Le langage mâle de la vertu*: women and the discourse of the French revolution. See Ref. 84, pp. 120–35
 335. Paine, R., ed. 1981. *Politically Speaking: Cross-Cultural Studies of Rhetoric*. Philadelphia: Inst. Stud. Hum. Issues
 336. Paine, R. 1981. The political uses of metaphor and metonym: an exploratory statement. See Ref. 335, pp. 187–200
 337. Paredes, A. 1968. Folk medicine and the intercultural jest. In *Spanish Speaking People in the United States: Proceedings of the 1968 American Ethnological Association Spring Meeting*, ed. J. Helm, pp. 104–19. Seattle: Univ. Wash. Press
 338. Parkin, D. 1984. Political language. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 13:345–65
 339. Peirce, C. S. 1974. *Collected Papers*, ed. C. Hatshorne, P. Weiss, Vols. 1 & 2. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press
 340. Philips, S. 1980. Sex differences and language. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 14:557–81
 341. Philips, S., Steele, S., Tanz, C., eds. 1987. *Language, Gender, and Sex in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press

342. Pittenger, R. E., Hockett, C. F., Danahy, J. J. 1960. *The First Five Minutes: A Sample of Microscopic Interview Analysis*. Ithaca: Paul Martineau
343. Plutchik, R. 1980. A general psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. In *Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience*, ed. R. Plutchik, H. Kellerman, 1:3-33. New York: Academic
344. Poynton, C. 1989. *Language and Gender: Making the Difference*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press
345. Prince, E. F. 1978. A comparison of WH-clefts and It-clefts in discourse. *Language* 54:883-906
346. Prelli, L. J. 1989. The rhetorical construction of scientific ethos. See Ref. 400, pp. 48-68
347. Radway, J. A. 1984. *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature*. Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press
348. Read, K. 1967. Morality and the concept of the person among the Gahukugama. In *Myths and Cosmos*, ed. J. Middleton, pp. 185-230. New York: Natural History Press
349. Rommetveit, R. 1972. *Språk, Tanke og Kommunikasjon*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget
350. Rommetveit, R. 1988. On literacy and the myth of literal meaning. See Ref. 359, pp. 13-40
351. Rosaldo, M. Z. 1974. Woman, culture, and society: a theoretical overview. See Ref. 354, pp. 17-42
352. Rosaldo, M. Z. 1980. *Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
353. Rosaldo, M. Z. 1984. Toward an anthropology of self and feeling. See Ref. 393, pp. 137-57
354. Rosaldo, M. Z., Lamphere, L., eds. 1974. *Woman, Culture, and Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press
355. Rosch, E. 1976. Review of *Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning*. *Am. Anthropol.* 78:659-60
356. Roy, A. M. 1981. The function of irony in discourse. *Text* 1:407-23
357. Sacks, H. 1974. An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation. See Ref. 34, pp. 337-53
358. Säljö, R., ed. 1988. *The Written World: Studies in Literate Thought and Action*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag
359. Salovey, P., Rosenham, D. L. 1989. Mood states and prosocial behavior. See Ref. 442, pp. 371-91
360. Samarin, W. 1967. Determining the meaning of ideophones. *J. Afr. Linguist.* 4(2):35-41
361. Samarin, W. 1970. Inventory and choice in expressive language. *Word* 26:153-69
362. Sampson, G. 1980. *Schools of Linguistics*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press
363. Sapir, E. 1921. *Language*. New York: Harcourt Brace
364. Sapir, E. 1927. Speech as a personality trait. *Am. J. Sociol.* 32:892-905
365. Saussure, F. de. 1916. *Cours de Linguistique Générale*. Paris: Payot
366. Scherer, K. R. 1979. Personality markers in speech. In *Social Markers in Speech*, ed. K. R. Scherer, H. Giles, pp. 147-209. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
367. Scherer, K. R. 1988. On the symbolic function of vocal affect expressions. *J. Lang. Soc. Psychol.* 7:79-100
368. Scherer, K. R., Ladd, D. R., Silverman, K. E. A. 1984. Vocal cues to speaker affect: testing two models. *J. Acoust. Soc. Am.* 76:1346-56
369. Schieffelin, B. B. 1984. Ade: a sociolinguistic analysis of a relationship. In *Language in Use: Readings in Sociolinguistics*, ed. J. Baugh, J. Sherzer, pp. 229-43. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall
370. Schieffelin, B. B. 1985. The acquisition of Kaluli. See Ref. 401, 1:525-95
371. Schieffelin, B. B. 1990. *The Give and Take of Everyday Life: Language Socialization of Kaluli Children*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
372. Schieffelin, B. B., Ochs, E. 1986. Language socialization. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 15:163-91
373. Schieffelin, B. B., Ochs, E., eds. 1986. *Language Socialization Across Cultures*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
374. Schiffrin, D. 1987. *Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
375. Schourup, L. C. 1985. *Common Discourse Particles in English Conversation*. New York: Garland
376. Schudson, M. 1978. *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers*. New York: Basic Books
377. Scott, J. C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
378. Scott, J. C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
379. Schütz, A. 1945. On multiple realities. *Philos. Phenomenol. Res.* 5:533-76
380. Searle, J. R. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
381. Sebeok, T. A., ed. 1960. *Style in Language*. Cambridge: MIT Press

382. Seeger, A. 1987. *Why Suyá Sing: A Musical Anthropology of an Amazonian People*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
383. Sennett, R. 1977. *The Fall of Public Man: On the Social Psychology of Capitalism*. New York: Knopf
384. Sennett, R. 1980. *Authority*. New York: Knopf
385. Sennett, R., Cobb, J. 1972. *The Hidden Injuries of Class*. New York: Knopf
386. Sherzer, J. 1983. *Kuna Ways of Speaking: An Ethnographic Perspective*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press
387. Sherzer, J. 1987. A diversity of voices: men's and women's speech in ethnographic perspective. See Ref. 341, pp. 95–120
388. Sherzer, J., Urban, G., eds. 1986. *Native South American Discourse*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter
389. Shopen, T., ed. 1985. *Language Typology and Linguistic Description*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 3 Vols.
390. Shore, B. 1982. *Sala'ilua: A Samoan Mystery*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press
391. Shotter, J. 1989. Social accountability and the social construction of 'you.' See Ref. 400, pp. 133–51
392. Shuman, A. 1986. *Storytelling Rights: The Uses of Oral and Written Texts by Urban Adolescents*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
393. Shweder, R. A., LeVine, R. A., eds. 1984. *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
394. Siegler, D., Siegler, R. 1976. Stereotypes of males' and females' speech. *Psychol. Rep.* 39:167–70
395. Silverman, D., Torode, B. 1980. *The Material Word: Some Theories of Language and its Limits*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
396. Silverstein, M. 1976. Shifters, linguistic categories, and cultural description. In *Meaning in Anthropology*, ed. K. H. Basso, H. A. Selby, pp. 11–55. Albuquerque: Univ. New Mexico Press
397. Silverstein, M. 1979. Language structure and linguistic ideology. In *The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels*, ed. P. R. Clyne, W. F. Hanks, C. L. Hofbauer, pp. 193–247. Chicago: Chicago Linguist. Soc.
398. Silverstein, M. 1981. The limits of awareness. *Working Papers in Sociolinguistics*, 84. Austin: Southw. Educ. Dev. Lab.
399. Silverstein, M. 1987. The three faces of "function": preliminaries to a psychology of language. In *Social and Functional Approaches to Language and Thought*, ed. M. Hickmann, pp. 17–38. Orlando: Academic
400. Simons, H. W., ed. 1989. *Rhetoric in the Human Sciences*. London: Sage
401. Slobin, D. I., ed. 1985. *The Crosslinguistic Study of Language Acquisition*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. 2 Vols.
402. Smith, J. 1981. Self and experience in Maori culture. See Ref. 199, pp. 145–59
403. Smith, P. M. 1985. *Language, the Sexes and Society*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
404. Smith-Rosenberg, C. 1975. The female world of love and ritual: relations between women in nineteenth century America. *Signs* 1:1–29
405. Sperber, D., Wilson, D. 1986. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell
406. Spradley, J. P., Mann, B. J. 1975. *The Cocktail Waitress: Woman's Work in a Man's World*. New York: John Wiley
407. Stankiewicz, E. 1964. Problems of emotive language. In *Approaches to Semiotics: Cultural Anthropology, Education, Linguistics, Psychiatry, Psychology*, ed. T. A. Sebeok, A. S. Hayes, M. C. Bateson, pp. 239–64. The Hague: Mouton
408. Street, B. V. 1984. *Literacy in Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
409. Street, B. V. 1988. Literacy practices and literacy myths. See Ref. 359, pp. 59–72
410. Talmy, L. 1985. Lexicalization patterns: semantic structure in lexical forms. See Ref. 389, 3:57–149
411. Tannen, D. 1982. Oral and literate strategies in spoken and written discourse. *Language* 58:1–21
412. Tannen, D., ed. 1982. *Spoken and Written Language: Exploring Orality and Literacy*. Norwood: Ablex
413. Tannen, D. 1982. The oral/literate continuum in discourse. See Ref. 412, pp. 1–16
414. Tannen, D., ed. 1988. *Linguistics in Context: Connecting Observation and Understanding*. Norwood: Ablex
415. Tannen, D. 1988. Hearing voices in conversation, fiction, and mixed genres. See Ref. 414, pp. 89–113
416. Tannen, D. 1989. *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
417. Tannen, D., Saville-Troike, M., eds. 1985. *Perspectives on Silence*. Norwood: Ablex
418. Thibault, P. J. 1988. Knowing what you're told by the Agony Aunts: language function, gender difference and the structure of knowledge and belief in

- the personal columns. See Ref. 48, pp. 205–33
419. Thorne, B., Kramarae, C., Henley, N. 1983. *Language, Gender and Society*. Rowley: Newbury House
 420. Tokunaga, M. 1988. A paradox in Japanese pragmatics. *Pap. Pragmat.* 2:84–105
 421. Traugott, E. C. 1982. From propositional to textual and expressive meanings: some semantic-pragmatic aspects of grammaticalization. In *Perspectives on Historical Linguistics*, ed. W. P. Lehmann, Y. Malkiel, pp. 245–71. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
 422. Traugott, E. C. 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: an example of subjectification in semantic change. *Language* 65:31–55
 423. Trew, T. 1979. Theory and ideology at work. See Ref. 143, pp. 94–116
 424. Tyler, S. A. 1978. *The Said and the Unsaid: Mind, Meaning, and Culture*. New York: Academic
 425. Uhlenbeck, E. M. 1978. Peripheral verb categories with emotive-expressive or onomatopoeic value in modern Javanese. In *Studies in Javanese Morphology*, pp. 136–49. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
 426. Ullman, S. 1964. *Language and Style: Collected Papers*. Oxford: Blackwell
 427. Ultan, R. 1978. Size-sound symbolism. See Ref. 174, pp. 525–68
 428. Urban, G. 1985. The semiotics of two speech styles in Shokleng. See Ref. 306, pp. 311–29
 429. Urban, G. 1986. The semiotic functions of macro-parallelism in the Shokleng origin myth. See Ref. 388, pp. 15–57
 430. Urban, G. 1986. Rhetoric of a war chief. *Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies*, Vol. 5. Chicago: Cent. Psychosoc. Stud.
 431. Urban, G. 1987. The ‘I’ of discourse. *Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies*, Vol. 10. Chicago: Cent. Psychosoc. Stud.
 432. Urban, G. 1988. Ritual wailing in Amerindian Brazil. *Am. Anthropol.* 90:385–400
 433. Vachek, J., ed. 1964. *A Prague School Reader in Linguistics*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
 434. Vachek, J. 1966. *The Linguistic School of Prague*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
 435. van Dijk, T. A. 1984. *Prejudice in Discourse: An Analysis of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
 436. van Dijk, T. A., ed. 1985. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Vols. 1–4. London: Academic
 437. Varenne, H. 1977. *American Together: Structured Diversity in a Midwestern Town*. New York: Teachers College Press
 438. Varenne, H. 1987. Talk and real talk: the voices of silence and the voices of power in American family life. *Cult. Anthropol.* 2:369–94
 439. Volek, B. 1987. *Emotive Signs in Language and Semantic Functioning of Derived Nouns in Russian*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
 440. Vološinov, V. N. 1929. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Transl. L. Matejka, I. R. Titunik, 1973. New York: Seminar Press
 441. Wagley, C. 1977. *Welcome of Tears: The Tapirapé Indians of Central Brazil*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press
 442. Wagner, H., Manstead, A., eds. 1989. *Handbook of Social Psychophysiology*. Chichester: John Wiley
 443. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., White, G. 1990. *Disentangling: Conflict Discourse in Pacific Societies*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press
 444. Watts, R. J. 1989. Taking the pitcher to the ‘well’: native speaker’s perception of their use of discourse markers in conversation. *J. Pragmat.* 13:203–37
 445. Weinreich, U. 1980. *On Semantics*, ed. W. Labov, B. S. Weinreich. Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
 446. White, G. M. 1990. Moral discourse and the rhetoric of emotions. See Ref. 292, pp. 46–68
 447. White, G. M., Kirkpatrick, J., eds. 1985. *Person, Self, and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
 448. Wierzbicka, A. 1986. Italian reduplication: Cross-cultural pragmatics and illocutionary semantics. *Linguistics* 24: 287–315
 449. Willis, P. 1977. *Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs*. Westmead: Saxon House
 450. Wowk, M. T. 1989. Emotion talk. In *Text and Talk as Social Practice*, ed. B. Torode, pp. 51–71. Dordrecht: Foris